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COMMENT 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL CONSTRUCTION: THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT AS A LIMIT ON BUILDING                         
PRISONS ON TOXIC WASTE SITES 
KELSEY D. RUSSELL† 
Over the last four decades, the United States has witnessed the emergence of a 
leviathan prison industrial complex. Eager to restore stagnating economies previously 
driven by coal-mining operations, many rural communities sought to take advantage 
of this prison-building boom through bids for facility construction contracts. As a 
result, a startling number of prisons have been built on active and former coal mines, coal 
ash dumps, and other environmentally hazardous locations. Long-term confinement in 
facilities located in, on, and near such locations poses severe and demonstrable health risks 
to the inmate populations through exposure to polluted air and water twenty-four hours a 
day, seven days a week, for the duration of their sentences. 
This Comment examines the doctrinal promise of a lawsuit to enjoin the 
construction of prisons on toxic waste sites based on the Eighth Amendment, before 
inmates are exposed to dangerous and sometimes fatal living conditions. Specifically, 
it asks whether planning to build a prison in a location bearing environmental risks 
known to cause serious illness and death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 
Despite certain obstacles, this Comment contends that the Supreme Court’s 
conditions-of-confinement jurisprudence bears the weight of such a claim. Due in 
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large part to the tireless efforts of prisoners’ rights organizations and activists, there is 
ample evidence demonstrating that inmates confined in facilities on or around toxic 
waste sites are developing exposure-related illnesses at alarming rates. Accordingly, 
planning to build a prison in a location with identical risks raises serious concerns 
under the Eighth Amendment. 
The import of this situation was perhaps best articulated by the Human Rights 
Defense Center, a prisoners’ rights organization actively engaged in putting an end to 
this disturbing trend: “If we can recognize the problem with forcing people to live in 
close proximity to toxic and hazardous environmental conditions, then why are we 
ignoring prisoners who are forced to live in detention facilities impacted by such 
conditions?” This Comment seeks not only to recognize the problem with forcing people 
to live in such conditions, but also to engage with a potential, albeit imperfect, solution. 
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“When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his human 
quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his intellect does not cease 
to feed on a free and open interchange of opinions; his yearning for self-respect 
does not end; nor is his quest for self-realization concluded.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The story of mass incarceration in America is not a new one.2 Over the 
last four decades, the number of incarcerated individuals in the United States 
has risen from approximately 300,000 to more than two million,3 constituting 
the highest incarceration rate among “countries comparable to the United 
States.”4 By the time this figure peaked in the late 2000s,5 it was well established 
that prison overcrowding had grown to become a problem of constitutional 
 
1 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
2 While it is commonly understood that the United States is “in the midst of the largest 
criminal justice experiment ever undertaken,” the origin, function, and normative appraisals of this 
phenomenon are hotly contested. Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, 
Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 169 (2013). Compare BERT USEEM & ANNE 
MORRISON PIEHL, PRISON STATE: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS INCARCERATION 170-74 (2008) 
(concluding that critics’ concerns about the prison “buildup” were overstated and that prison conditions 
actually improved to meet the needs of the growing incarcerated population), with MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 2 
(2010) (arguing that society “label[s] people of color ‘criminals’” as a proxy for racial discrimination 
because “it is no longer socially permissible to use race, explicitly”), and JONATHAN SIMON, MASS 
INCARCERATION ON TRIAL 6 (2014) (attributing overcrowding to arrest and plea bargain policies). 
3 See RYAN S. KING ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A 
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 1 (2005) (“[T]he number of people in prisons and jails [increased] from 
330,000 in 1972 to 2.1 million [in 2005].”). The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) estimates that the 
total incarcerated population in the United States in 2011 was 2,239,800. LAUREN E. GLAZE & 
ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 239972, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 2011, at 3 (2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus11.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4C5A-58SA]. The precise figure varies depending on how “incarcerated” is defined. BJS’s 
definition, for example, “[i]ncludes local jail inmates and prisoners held in the custody of state or federal 
prisons or privately operated facilities.” Id. at 3 tbl.2. 
4 See Tyjen Tsai & Paola Scommegna, U.S. Has World’s Highest Incarceration Rate, POPULATION 
REFERENCE BUREAU (Aug. 2012), http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2012/us-incarceration.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3W6W-7T8T] (noting that while “the natural rate of incarceration for countries 
comparable to the United States tends to stay around 100 prisoners per 100,000 [residents][,] [t]he U.S. 
rate is 500 prisoners per 100,000 residents . . . .”); see also ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, INST. 
FOR CRIMINAL POLICY RESEARCH, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 2 (11th ed. 2016) (counting the 
United States among “[t]he countries with the highest prison population rate,” with 698 prisoners per 
100,000 people). The only country with a higher prison population rate is Seychelles, with 799 prisoners 
per 100,000 people. Id. However, with a total population of only 93,186, Seychelles is not a country 
comparable to the United States, which has a population of 323,995,528. The World Factbook, CENT. 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119r
ank.html [https://perma.cc/C9Y2-7TF4] (last updated July 2016). 
5 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1 (2015), 
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf [https://perma.cc
/3EVG-Q4ZQ]. 
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proportions—specifically, a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.6 
To keep up with surging inmate populations, an unprecedented number 
of prisons have been constructed over the past thirty-five years and “[f]or a 
time in the mid-1990s, . . . a new U.S. prison opened every 15 days on 
average.”7 In particular, formerly coal-dependent rural communities began 
recruiting prison facilities in the hopes that construction and subsequent operations 
would jumpstart waning economies.8 While prison-based development is not by 
any means guaranteed to generate economic value,9 this Comment is concerned 
with a disturbing pattern that has emerged as a result of such attempts at 
economic development: prisons are being built on environmentally unsound 
lands, bearing potentially lethal health effects for inmates.10 In a letter to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), one prisoners’ rights organization 
 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. By the early 1980s, courts had “repeatedly characterized crowding 
as an unconstitutional condition of confinement.” Peter Finn, Judicial Responses to Prison Crowding, 
67 JUDICATURE 318, 321 (1984). Accordingly, “31 states were under court order to remedy crowded 
conditions” by the end of 1982. Id. 
7 SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41177, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF 
PRISON GROWTH 15 (2010); see also id. (“The federal government, states, and localities have 
financed and built hundreds of new prisons during the past three decades in what may be one of the 
more concerted public works projects in recent history.”). 
8 See Robert C. Turner & David Thayer, Yes in My Backyard! Why Do Rural Communities 
Use Prison Based Economic Development Strategies? 2 (undated) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.
skidmore.edu/~bturner/Prisons%20_ED_strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/JKL3-DWV5] (“In the 1990s, 
rural America experienced a dramatic prison-building boom, with 245 prisons opening in 212 of the 
nation’s 2,290 rural counties . . . .”); id. at 3 (“The unlikely emergence of prisons as a rural economic 
development strategy is the product of the convergence of two seemingly unrelated trends: the 
economic downturn in rural America and the dramatic increase in the U.S. prison population.”); see 
also Eric Markowitz, Poison Prison: Is Toxic Dust Sickening Inmates Locked Up in Coal Country?, PRISON 
LEGAL NEWS (May 27, 2015), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2015/may/27/poison-prison-
toxic-dust-sickening-inmates-locked-coal-country/ [https://perma.cc/FAA9-RGE6] (“[T]here’s a 
reason former coal towns welcome prisons: money . . . . Affluent towns almost never allow prisons 
to be built near residents. But coal towns like LaBelle, where the per capita income is $18,797, are 
more open to the idea.”). See generally Amy K. Glasmeier & Tracey L. Farrigan, The Economic Impacts 
of the Prison Development Boom on Persistently Poor Rural Places, 30 INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 274 
(2007) (summarizing the effects of prison development in rural communities). 
9 See KIRCHHOFF, supra note 7, at 32-33 (describing the vastly different experiences of two 
small towns that relied on prison construction as an economic development tool); see also Tracy 
Huling, Building a Prison Economy in Rural America (describing lesser known drawbacks and risks of 
prisons as an economic development strategy, including the fact that most prison jobs go to people 
outside the community, that such jobs have high turnover rates, and that prisoners themselves may 
“displace low-wage workers in struggling rural areas”), in FROM INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT  197, 201-04 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-
Lind, eds., 2002). 
10 See Facts, NATION INSIDE: PRISON ECOLOGY PROJECT, https://nationinside.org/campaign/
prison-ecology/facts/ [https://perma.cc/H2NP-6XTG] (providing numerous examples of potentially fatal 
environmental conditions throughout the nation’s prisons, including repeated methane gas explosions at 
Rikers Island jail in New York City, airborne coal ash toxins at a state prison in Pennsylvania, and 
water contamination at detention facilities across the country). 
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framed the issue as follows: “If we can recognize the problem with forcing 
people to live in close proximity to toxic and hazardous environmental 
conditions, then why are we ignoring prisoners who are forced to live in 
detention facilities impacted by such conditions?”11 
The Eighth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s conditions-of- 
confinement jurisprudence12 might provide a reprieve, and a path, to enjoin 
the construction of prisons slated for toxic waste sites and thereby avoid the 
corresponding health risks altogether. Investigation into the Eighth Amendment 
implications of the environmental conditions at the State Correctional 
Institute at Fayette (SCI Fayette) in LaBelle, Pennsylvania, which was built 
adjacent to a coal mining site,13 is ongoing.14 This Comment contends that 
the doctrinal basis upon which advocates have challenged the conditions at 
SCI Fayette is equally applicable to the forthcoming construction of the 
United States Penitentiary Letcher County (USP Letcher), a new federal prison 
in Kentucky, also destined for construction atop a coal mine.15 Litigants could 
argue that the decision to move forward despite known risks and hazards 
associated with this location violates the Eighth Amendment on a theory of 
deliberately indifferent design. 
 
11 Letter from Paul Wright, Exec. Dir., Human Rights Def. Ctr., to Charles Lee, Deputy 
Assoc. Assistant Adm’r for Envtl. Justice, USEPA 2 (July 14, 2015), https://www.humanrightsdefe
nsecenter.org/media/publications/EJ%202020%20HRDC%20Prison%20Ecology%20comment%20to
%20EPA%20with%2091%20sign%20ons%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L6G-P28A] [hereinafter 
HRDC Letter to EPA]. 
12 See infra Section II.A. For a comprehensive review of the evolving relationship between the 
Eighth Amendment and prison conditions, see generally Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, 
and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (2009).  
13 Markowitz, supra note 8. 
14 See Raven Rakia, Coal Ash May Be Making Pennsylvania Inmates Sick, and Now They’re Fighting 
to Shut Their Prison Down, VICE (May 4, 2015, 8:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ashes-
to-ashes-0000651-v22n5 [https://perma.cc/Q84E-TB78] (noting that the Abolitionist Law Center 
(ALC) plans to expand a previously conducted survey of SCI Fayette inmates because they were 
“unsatisfied” with the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ findings that the air quality at SCI 
Fayette was “healthy”); see also Deidre Fulton, ‘No Escape’: Alarming Cancer Rates at Prison Built Next 
to Toxic Coal Dump, COMMON DREAMS (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.commondreams.org/news/2014
/09/02/no-escape-alarming-cancer-rates-prison-built-next-toxic-coal-dump [http://perma.cc/4S4L-
TJZ6] (stating that a report issued by the ALC and two partner organizations contend SCI Fayette’s 
location may violate the Constitution by virtue of inmates’ exposure to toxicants); Emily Petsko, 
Report Alleges Link Between Fly Ash, Health Problems at SCI-Fayette, OBSERVER-REP. (Sept. 5, 2014), 
http://www.observer-reporter.com/article/20140905/NEWS01/140909723 [https://perma.cc/NS3M-
S8YS] (reporting that, according to a volunteer from the Human Rights Coalition, “a positive link 
between the coal dump and health effects could be grounds for a lawsuit”). 
15 Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Kentucky Prison Project Opposed Over Threats 
to Endangered Wildlife, Water and People (July 31, 2015), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/ne
ws/press_releases/2015/letcher-county-prison-07-30-2015.html [https://perma.cc/JMD7-UX32] [hereinafter 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity Press Release]. 
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Part I explores the increasing trend of building prisons on environmentally 
toxic locations, with attention to the history and environmental circumstances 
of SCI Fayette and USP Letcher. Part II examines the Eighth Amendment 
framework as it has developed from the 1970s to present day, the span of 
decades that have seen the most rapid increase in prison population in United 
States history.16 Building upon a report issued by the Abolitionist Law Center 
(ALC),17 Part III fits the environmentally hazardous conditions at SCI 
Fayette into the legal framework described in Part II. Part III also applies the 
Eighth Amendment framework to the planned construction in Letcher 
County, arguing that the environmental hazards inherent to the location 
render the prison’s design unconstitutional.18 Part IV examines the practical 
limitations of an Eighth Amendment claim based on prospective harm—
including challenges posed by federal justiciability doctrines and the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)19—and proposes that state courts may 
prove a potential solution to these obstacles. The Comment concludes by 
considering whether constitutional litigation makes sense for advocates from a 
strategic standpoint, as compared to other potential methods. 
While “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,”20 the 
Eighth Amendment is animated by the respect for the “human dignity 
inherent in all persons.”21 This Comment contends that when the government 
knowingly houses prisoners in demonstrably dangerous facilities, it fails to 
fulfill its obligations to provide for prisoners’ basic needs such that “the courts 
have a responsibility to remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment violation.”22 
I. THE PROBLEM: PRISONS IN UNSAFE LOCATIONS 
In recent years, an alarming number of prisons have been built throughout 
the country on or near environmentally hazardous sites.23 Many of these prisons 
 
16 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 5 (displaying a graph that depicts the growth 
in the prison population every four years from 1934 through 2014). 
17 The ALC is a public interest law firm based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, “organized for the 
purpose of abolishing class and race based mass incarceration in the United States.” About, 
ABOLITIONIST L. CTR., http://abolitionistlawcenter.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/Z3J7-3ZRA]. In 
2014, the ALC published a report that advanced Eighth Amendment arguments to examine 
“potential legal action in support of prisoners at SCI Fayette.” DUSTIN S. MCDANIEL ET AL., 
ABOLITIONIST LAW. CTR., NO ESCAPE: EXPOSURE TO TOXIC COAL WASTE AT STATE 
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FAYETTE 21 (undated).  
18 See infra subsection II.B.2 for a discussion of the Eighth Amendment’s scienter requirements. 
19 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
20 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). 
21 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011). 
22 Id. at 511. 
23 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. However, only thirty years ago, the idea of building 
a prison on a toxic waste site was considered “egregious.” In Pennsylvania, for example, a proposal 
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are located in close proximity to “superfund” sites, which are “uncontrolled or 
abandoned hazardous-waste sites” governed by the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).24 Other prisons 
have been built on and near “brownfield” sites, defined as property for which 
expansion, redevelopment, or reuse “may be complicated by the presence or 
potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”25 
Brownfield sites are also governed by CERCLA.26 To regulate Superfund 
sites, CERCLA gives the EPA the “power to seek out those parties 
responsible for any release and assure their cooperation in the cleanup.”27 
Imploring the Agency to consider its unique position to address the distinct 
“circumstances of prisoner populations,” the Human Rights Defense Center 
(HRDC) identified a number of prisons on or near superfund and other 
hazardous sites for the EPA in a July 2015 letter.28 The discussion of SCI Fayette 
and USP Letcher contained therein provides helpful context for the Eighth 
Amendment analysis that follows.29   
 
by a private company to build a maximum security prison on a toxic waste site led a spokesperson 
for the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections to comment, “If it were a state facility, we certainly 
would be concerned about the grounds where the facility is located.” Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of 
Corrections: Defining the Issues, 69 JUDICATURE 325, 327 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also id. (referring to the proposal as “[o]ne example of the potentially egregious effects of reducing 
accountability and regulation” of privatizing corrections). 
24 Summary of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(Superfund), EPA: ENFORCEMENT, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-comprehensiv
e-environmental-response-compensation-and-liability-act [https://perma.cc/P4FW-4BBL] [hereinafter 
Summary of CERCLA] (last updated Feb. 8, 2016); see also Alejandra Roman, Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), United States, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
EARTH (Apr. 14, 2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20160401092048/http://www.eoearth.org/view/
article/151409 [https://perma.cc/X4XS-AEKS] (“[CERCLA] is the main federal law of the United 
States that addresses the clean up of hazardous substances.”). 
25 Brownfield Overview and Definition, EPA: BROWNFIELDS, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields
/brownfield-overview-and-definition [https://perma.cc/9RPW-24QG] (last updated Aug. 3, 2016). 
26 See Brownfields Laws and Regulations, EPA: BROWNFIELDS https://www.epa.gov/brownfie
lds/brownfields-laws-and-regulations [https://perma.cc/2C6T-GK9E] (last updated Aug. 3, 2016) 
(explaining how CERCLA was amended to provide “funds to assess and clean up brownfields”). 
27 Summary of CERCLA, supra note 24. 
28 HRDC Letter to EPA, supra note 11, at 2, 5-8.  
29 From the long list of examples the letter provided, I chose to focus on SCI Fayette and 
Letcher County because of (1) the similarity of SCI Fayette’s location to the planned site for Letcher 
County and (2) because the evidence gathered by the ALC about the health conditions of inmates 
at SCI Fayette forms a basis for the deliberately indifferent design theory that I propose. Those not 
included here are Orleans Parish Prison, Escambia County Jail, South Central Regional Jail, Sing 
Sing Correctional Facility, Rikers Island jail, thirteen Colorado prisons, Avenal and Pleasant Valley 
State Prisons, Kern Valley State Prison, Wallace Pack Unit, Victorville Federal Correctional 
Complex, and Northwest Detention Center. Id. at 5-8. 
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A. The State Correctional Institution at Fayette                                                                         
(SCI Fayette), (LaBelle, Pennsylvania) 
SCI Fayette is located in LaBelle, Pennsy lvania, a town once home to 
“one of the largest coal preparation plants in the world.”30 The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania purchased the plot of land upon which SCI 
Fayette now sits from Matt Canestrale Contracting (MCC),31 which 
continues to operate a coal ash dump on the land directly abutting SCI 
Fayette.32 Proximity to coal has verifiable negative health consequences, as 
“fugitive dust”—the “[w]indblown particulates from dry disposal”33—puts those 
nearby at risk of arsenic exposure.34 SCI Fayette has been the subject of 
investigation by the ALC, which has uncovered patterns of illness among 
inmates that correspond to coal ash poisoning.35 Specifically, the ALC found 
that over eighty-one percent of responding prisoners reported respiratory, 
throat, and sinus conditions; sixty-eight percent of responding prisoners 
experienced gastrointestinal problems; eleven prisoners died from cancer at 
SCI Fayette between January 2010 and December 2013; and that another six 
prisoners have reported being diagnosed with cancer while at the prison.36 Not 
surprisingly, some estimate that since 1999, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection has issued nine notices of violation to MCC for failing 
to cover its trucks hauling coal ash waste.37 
B. Forthcoming: United States Penitentiary Letcher                                             
(USP Letcher), (Roxana, Kentucky) 
After nearly a decade of lobbying, the Letcher County Planning Commission 
succeeded in bringing another federal prison to Central Appalachia, which “has 
 
30 Markowitz, supra note 8. 
31 See id. (noting that the Commonwealth repurchased the land for $575,000 in 2000). 
32 See MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 15 (explaining that the prison is “directly adjacent 
to MCC’s coal ash dump” and at least one slurry pond). 
33 BARBARA GOTTLIEB ET AL., PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY AND EARTHJUSTICE, 
COAL ASH: THE TOXIC THREAT TO OUR HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT 12 (2010). 
34 See id. at 2 (“In addition to drinking water, arsenic can enter the body via . . . [i]nhaling . . . 
coal ash fugitive dust.”). 
35 See Mumia Abu-Jamal, Pollution Prison in Pennsylvania, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (June 3, 2015), 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2015/jun/3/pollution-prison-pennsylvania/ [http://perma.cc/
G2TD-925W] (noting the ALS’s finding that the prison “caused or was a significant contributor to 
nearly a dozen cancer deaths and serious life-threatening diseases and disorders” and explaining that 
that the “culprit . . . is the wide array of chemicals in the surrounding dump site from the fly ash 
and coal waste”); see also GOTTLIEB ET AL., supra note 33, at vii (“[C]oal ash toxics have the potential 
to injure all of the major organ systems, damage physical health and development, and even 
contribute to mortality.”). 
36 MCDANIEL ET. AL., supra note 17, at 1-2. See generally Fulton, supra note 14 (summarizing 
the findings of the ALC report). 
37 Markowitz, supra note 8. 
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become one of the most concentrated areas of new prison growth.”38 On February 
25, 2016, Attorney General Loretta Lynch confirmed that the Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP) would move forward with plans to construct a federal prison in Letcher 
County, which is anticipated to house over 1000 inmates.39 The location is a 
mountaintop removal coal mine site,40 which shares many of the toxic features 
making prisoners sick at SCI Fayette.41 
In economically depressed former coal towns, “hearing a federal prison could 
bring hundreds of new jobs is great news for many.”42 But the proposed Letcher 
County prison prompted almost 100 social justice, environmental, and prisoners’ 
rights organizations to write to the EPA “urging it to include the 2.3 million 
people incarcerated in the United States in its ‘Environmental Justice 2020 
Action’ agenda.”43 The letter asserted that prisoners, who are “almost entirely low-
income” and “constitute the most vulnerable and overburdened demographic of 
citizens in the country,” should be included “both in the permitting of prisons 
themselves and the permitting of other industrial facilities operating in proximity 
to prisons.”44 However, USP Letcher is no longer a proposal. While shovels 
have not yet hit the dirt, as one reporter noted, “[I]t’s only a matter of time 
before inmates are booked in Roxana, Kentucky.”45 
 
38 Sylvia Ryerson, Speak Your Piece: Prison Progress?, DAILY YONDER: BEYOND COAL (Feb. 20, 
2013), http://www.dailyyonder.com/speak-your-piece-prison-progress/2013/02/20/5651/#comments 
[https://perma.cc/JAJ2-6YWJ]. USP Letcher “will be the fourth new federal prison to come to 
eastern Kentucky, and the sixth federal prison built in Central Appalachia, since 1992—in addition 
to many new state prisons.” Id. 
39 Alix Casper-Peak, Federal Prison Coming to Letcher County, MOUNTAIN NEWS WYMT (Feb. 
26, 2016, 1:52 PM), http://www.wymt.com/content/news/Federal-prison-coming-to-Letcher-Count
y-370050921.html [http://perma.cc/HF8N-ARE9]. 
40 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity Press Release, supra note 15 (describing the proposed 
location as an unsafe facility “built on a mountaintop-removal coal-mine site”). 
41 Prisoners are not the only ones getting sick; LaBelle residents and guards at SCI Fayette 
have complained of similar health complications. See Markowitz, supra note 8 (“For years, local 
LaBelle residents, and more recently prison guards at Fayette, have complained that the site has 
been making them sick.”); Kevin Williams, ‘Poisonous Lands’: Pennsylvania Prison Built Next to Toxic 
Dump, ALJAZEERA AM. (Feb. 25, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2016/2/25/
prison-pennsylvania-toxic-dump.html [https://perma.cc/ZEC3-S3FJ] (reporting instances of prison 
guards being diagnosed with cancer). 
42 Casper-Peak, supra note 39. 
43 Panagioti Tsolkas, Opinion, Federal Prison in Letcher County Wrong for Region, Environment, 
Prisoners, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Aug. 31, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.kentucky.com/
opinion/op-ed/article42610920.html [http://perma.cc/5B4G-BVGJ]. The EJ 2020 Action Agenda is an 
EPA strategy to “make our vulnerable, environmentally burdened, and economically disadvantaged 
communities healthier, cleaner and more sustainable places in which to live, work, play and learn.” About 
EJ 2020, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/about-ej-2020#about [https://perma.cc/M5
98-BVAN] (last updated Oct. 27, 2016). 
44 HRDC Letter to EPA, supra note 11, at 2-3; see also id. at 5 (“Our position is that the DOJ, 
as a participating agency in the implementation of [EJ 2020], should require prisoner populations 
to be explicitly included in the . . . process.”). 
45 Casper-Peak, supra note 39. 
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II. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PRISON CONDITIONS: THE CASE LAW 
Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.”46 More than 200 years after its adoption, 
the final clause, the Cruel and Unusual Clause, continues to generate 
fundamental questions: “What does it mean for a punishment to be ‘cruel and 
unusual’? How do we measure a punishment’s cruelty? And if a punishment 
is cruel, why should we care whether it is ‘unusual’?”47 Historically, the 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was primarily considered to 
assess the constitutionality of particular criminal sanctions.48 The majority of 
standards articulated by the Supreme Court in the Eighth Amendment 
context highlight the Clause’s historical function as an interdiction against 
cruel and unusual punishments imposed by a sentencing tribunal.49 For 
example, “[t]he prohibition . . . has been held to forbid punishments that are 
‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime; that are ‘totally without penological 
justification’; that ‘involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’; and 
that are inconsistent with ‘evolving standards of decency.’”50 
Prison conditions were not considered to have Eighth Amendment 
implications until long after its ratification. Before the 1970s, courts had 
intentionally declined to address prison issues, subscribing to the so-called “hands-
off doctrine,” which called for “deference to the legislatures.”51 However, modern 
courts now overwhelmingly agree that the Eighth Amendment also operates as a 
limit on the administration of criminal sentences—“the way the state executes 
otherwise constitutional punishments.”52 This evolution was prompted by an 
 
46 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
47 Bryan A. Stevenson & John F. Stinneford, The Eighth Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR., 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-viii [https://perma.cc/
DB4N-PB58]. 
48 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (“[T]he primary concern of the drafters 
was to proscribe ‘torture[s]’ and other ‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment.” (alterations in original) 
(quoting Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 
57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 842 (1969))). 
49 See Dolovich, supra note 12, at 884 (2009) (“To the extent that the Supreme Court has considered 
what makes a punishment cruel, it has done so primarily in assessing criminal sanctions.”). 
50 Id. at 883-84 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 
(1977); then quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976); and then quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 
173; and then quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002)). 
51 Stacy Lancaster Cozad, Note, Cruel but Not So Unusual: Farmer v. Brennan and the Devolving 
Standards of Decency, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 175, 179 (1995). Essentially, the doctrine “stated that the 
federal government had no legal standing to interfere in the operations of state institutions.” Robert 
T. Sigler & Chadwick L. Shook, The Federal Judiciary and Corrections: Breaking the “Hands-Off ” 
Doctrine, 7 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 245, 245 (1995). 
52 Dolovich, supra note 12, at 884 (emphasis added). As Dolovich contends, this extension was 
a practical necessity: “If the prohibition on cruel punishment is to mean anything in a society where 
incarceration is the most common penalty for criminal acts, it must also limit what the state can do 
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unprecedented increase in the number of petitions for relief from substandard 
conditions of confinement during the same period of time that the prison 
population increased exponentially.53 Courts throughout the country were faced 
with a relatively new breed of Eighth Amendment claims alleging cruel and 
unusual prison conditions related to overcrowding and had the task of addressing 
conditions approaching the unimaginable.54 
In landmark decisions such as Holt v. Sarver,55 Rhem v. Malcolm,56 and 
Ruiz v. Estelle,57 courts responded to deplorable correctional environments 
and issued injunctions ordering “agencies to improve these conditions or face 
remedies ranging from stiff fines to mass releases of prisoners.”58 For its part, 
the Supreme Court “ushered in the modern jurisprudence of inmates’ rights,” 
making it clear that conditions of confinement were subject to Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny in a line of cases starting with Estelle v. Gamble.59 
The following Section tracks the Court’s conditions-of-confinement doctrine 
and the development of the present standard. The analysis entails an objective and 
 
to prisoners over the course of their incarceration.” Id. at 885. But see Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 
304 (1991) (“Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in 
combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that 
produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise . . . .”). 
53 See Finn, supra note 6, at 321 (“Since [1971], no region in the country has been unaffected by 
. . . court orders to eliminate substandard conditions of confinement, including crowding. By 1976, 
over 19,000 petitions for relief had been filed in federal courts, representing over 15 per cent [sic] of 
the entire civil case filings.”). 
54 See Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurisprudence: Conditions of 
Confinement, 48 SMU. L. REV. 373, 374 (1995) (“Increased prison population has not resulted in 
increased prison capacity. Paradoxically, even when states have undertaken massive building programs, 
they have often ended up putting more people in prison, further contributing to overcrowding. 
Conditions that were already deplorable have only continued to worsen.”). 
55 See 309 F. Supp. 362, 372-73 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (holding that conditions in Arkansas 
penitentiary operations violated the Eighth Amendment and concluding that “confinement itself 
within a given institution may amount to a cruel and unusual punishment . . . where [it] is 
characterized by conditions and practices so bad as to be shocking to the conscience of reasonably 
civilized people”), aff ’d and remanded, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). 
56 See 371 F. Supp. 594, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding the “dismal conditions” of the Manhattan 
House of Detention for Men (the Tombs) subjected inmates to cruel punishment, violated the 
Constitution, and “would shock the conscience of any citizen who knew of them”), opinion 
supplemented, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff ’d and remanded, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).  
57 See 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1338, 1367 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (holding that conditions at certain facilities 
of the Texas Department of Corrections violated the Eighth Amendment due to overcrowding and 
inadequate health care, among other conditions), aff ’d in part and vacated in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 
1982). 
58 See Michele Deitch, The Need for Independent Prison Oversight in a Post-PLRA World, 24 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 236, 236 (2012) (discussing the watershed prison conditions decisions of the 1970s that 
made federal courts the “last refuge for prisoners”). Deitch argues that for forty years, federal “courts 
have provided a wedge in the steel doors of prisons and jails, preventing them from being entirely 
sealed off from external view.” Id. 
59 Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2013) 
(citing Estelle v Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). 
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subjective component, both of which must be established in order to substantiate a 
prison conditions claim. The objective prong requires a showing that a condition is 
sufficiently serious so as to deprive a prisoner “minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities.”60 The subjective prong requires a plaintiff-inmate to demonstrate 
that a given deprivation is the result of deliberate indifference on the part of 
prison officials—that officials both knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk 
to inmate health or safety.”61 
A. Development of the Objective and Subjective Requirements 
Estelle v. Gamble is one of the first prison conditions cases taken up by the 
Court.62 The plaintiff in Estelle, inmate Gamble, brought an Eighth Amendment 
claim based on the inadequate medical care he received for a back injury sustained 
after a 600-pound bale of cotton fell on him during a work assignment at the 
prison.63 After repeated ineffective treatments, a stint in solitary confinement 
for refusing to work, and a lack of medical attention despite chest pains and 
“blank outs,” Gamble sued two Texas Department of Corrections officials and 
the prison’s medical director.64  
In its first major doctrinal shift away from the hands-off doctrine, the 
Court recognized that sufficiently harmful prison conditions, including the 
denial of medical care, could amount to a violation of the Eighth 
 
60 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). 
61 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
62 Decided in 1976, Estelle marked a break with the past, as the Eighth Amendment had 
remained “largely dormant for a century” prior. William J. Rold, Thirty Years After Estelle v. Gamble: 
A Legal Retrospective, 14 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 11, 13 (2008). Still, there are a variety of 
cases to which scholars have attributed the origins of the Court’s prison conditions doctrine. See, 
e.g., Lorena O'Neil, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement of the 1960s, FLASHBACK: OZY (Apr. 11, 2014), 
http://www.ozy.com/flashback/the-prisoners-rights-movement-of-the-1960s/30583 [https://perma.cc/GF
H8-JRFT] (noting that at least one prominent constitutional law scholar located the origin of the 
Court's prison conditions doctrine with the Court's decision in Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964), 
more than a decade before Estelle). 
63 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98-99, 101 (1976). Ira P. Robbins & Michael B. Buser, 
Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision 
of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893, 907 (1977) (noting 
that Holt v. Sarver “tentatively brought the more prosaic conditions of confinement within the ken 
of eighth amendment review”).  
64 Id. at 100-01. Gamble filed a handwritten pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 
98-99. Prisoners often file “section 1983” suits to challenge conditions of confinement. See Frank J. 
Remington, State Prisoner Access to Postconviction Relief–A Lessening Role for Federal Courts; An 
Increasingly Important Role for State Courts, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 292 (1983) (“Although state prisoner 
litigation in the federal courts has greatly increased, the increase has been attributable largely to 
section 1983 conditions-of-confinement litigation . . . .”); see also Cozad, supra note 51, at 177 n.17 (“A 
prisoner may bring an action directly under the auspices of the Eighth Amendment or under § 1983 . . . .”). 
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Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.65 Estelle 
marked the Court’s willingness to ensure the conditions of American prisons 
satisfied constitutional mandates. However, the Court also, “for the first time, 
required deliberate indifference in assessing cruel and unusual punishment 
claims.”66 In dismissing Gamble’s claims against the medical director of the 
prison, the Court noted that he had been “seen by medical personnel on 17 
occasions spanning a three-month period” and that the treatment he received was 
“[a]t most . . . medical malpractice.”67 Reasoning that “[m]edical malpractice 
does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a 
prisoner,” the Court held that only “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to 
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” violate the Eighth 
Amendment.68 Two years after Estelle, in Hutto v. Finney, the Court stated 
definitively that “[c]onfinement in a prison . . . is a form of punishment subject 
to scrutiny under [the] Eighth Amendment.”69 
Following its inception, the conditions-of-confinement doctrine dealt 
exclusively with the objective prong of the analysis—whether the conditions 
complained of were sufficiently serious—leaving the mental requirement 
noted in Estelle untouched for many years. In its next two major prison 
conditions decisions, Hutto and Rhodes v. Chapman,70 the Court refined the 
contours of the objective component. Specifically, the Court reached opposite 
conclusions on the objective prong, making these decisions helpful benchmarks 
in the early prison conditions cases. 
First, in Hutto, the Court held that the conditions in Arkansas prisons constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment, with a particular focus on punitive isolation: 
 Confinement in punitive isolation was for an indeterminate period of 
time. An average of 4, and sometimes as many as 10 or 11, prisoners were 
crowded into windowless 8'x10' cells containing no furniture other than a 
source of water and a toilet that could only be flushed from outside the cell. 
At night the prisoners were given mattresses to spread on the floor. Although 
 
65 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04 (noting that “denial of medical care may result in pain and 
suffering” that serves no penological purpose, thereby causing the type of “unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain” that the Eighth Amendment proscribes (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion))). While the Court dismissed 
Gamble’s complaint against Dr. Gray, his treating physician and the medical director of the 
Corrections Department, it remanded the case on the question of whether Gamble stated a claim 
against Estelle and Husbands, the Director of the Department of Corrections and the warden of the 
prison, respectively. Id. at 108. 
66 Cozad, supra note 51, at 180. 
67 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. 
68 Id. at 106. 
69 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978). This case started as Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 
1970), which is discussed above. See supra note 55. 
70 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
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some prisoners suffered from infectious diseases such as hepatitis and 
venereal disease, mattresses were removed and jumbled together each 
morning, then returned to the cells at random in the evening. Prisoners in 
isolation received fewer than 1,000 calories a day; their meals consisted 
primarily of 4-inch squares of “grue,” a substance created by mashing meat, 
potatoes, oleo, syrup, vegetables, eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking 
the mixture in a pan.71 
The Court upheld the district court’s finding that punitive isolation was cruel 
and unusual based exclusively on objective factors, without referring to an 
intent requirement.72 
In Rhodes, the Court revisited the objective prong once again, but this 
time held against the plaintiff-inmate class. The Court held that “[t]he double 
celling [arrangement in which two prisoners shared a cell that was] made 
necessary by the unanticipated increase in prison population did not lead to 
deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation.”73 Once again, the 
Court did not reach the state of mind question, which indicates that the objective 
prong determination was dispositive on the Eighth Amendment question.  
The Court finally readdressed deliberate indifference in the prison 
conditions context in 1991. In Wilson v. Seiter, a 5–4 decision, the Court held that 
the mental element articulated in Estelle applied to all conditions-of-confinement 
cases.74 Wilson’s complaint alleged unconstitutional “overcrowding, excessive 
noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper 
ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and 
food preparation, and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates.”75 The 
Court made clear that to qualify as unconstitutional “punishment” under the 
Eighth Amendment, the challenged practice had to be carried out with 
intent.76 After Wilson, any “prisoner claiming that conditions of confinement 
 
71 Hutto, 437 U.S. at 682-83 (footnote and citations omitted). 
72 See Amy Newman, Eighth Amendment—Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Conditions Cases, 
82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 979, 987 (1992) (“[I]n [Hutto,] the Court upheld a District Court’s 
limitation of punitive isolation based solely on objective criteria.”). Years later, the Court attributed 
the absence of an explicit intent discussion to the fact that “punitive isolation” inherently involves 
punitive intent. Id. at 987 n.67 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 
2321, 2324 n.2 (1991)). 
73 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348. 
74 See 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (“Whether one characterizes the treatment received by [the 
prisoner] as inhumane conditions of confinement, failure to attend to his medical needs, or a 
combination of both, it is appropriate to apply the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard articulated in 
Estelle.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting LaFaut v. Smith, 834 
F.2d 389, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1987))). 
75 Id. at 296. 
76 See id. at 300 (“The source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of this Court, 
but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted 
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constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment [had to] show a culpable state of 
mind on the part of prison officials.”77 
Estelle, Hutto, Rhodes, and Wilson have given shape to the prison conditions 
analysis: Conditions of confinement are indisputably subject to Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny, but a plaintiff-inmate must demonstrate that the 
conditions resulted in a sufficiently serious deprivation closer to the facts of 
Hutto (punitive isolation) than to Rhodes (double celling). Additionally, a 
plaintiff-inmate has to prove intent on the part of prison officials before 
conditions will be considered “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. 
B. Future Harm and Deliberate Indifference 
While the aforementioned cases answered some questions, they generated 
more: Must harm have already occurred for it to be sufficiently serious, or 
could an imminent risk of harm suffice? What was the scienter requirement 
within the subjective analysis? Who exactly must have acted with intent? In 
the early 1990s, the Court addressed these questions in Helling v. McKinney78 
and Farmer v. Brennan,79 respectively. 
1. Helling: Exposure to Unsafe Conditions 
In Helling, the Court addressed whether a complaint based on imminent 
harm, as opposed to past or present deprivation, could support a claim under 
the Eighth Amendment. Answering in the affirmative, the Court held that a 
prisoner demonstrating “a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely 
to cause serious illnesses and needless suffering” states a cognizable claim 
under the Eighth Amendment.80 In Helling, inmate McKinney filed a pro se 
civil rights complaint against various prison officials after being “assigned to 
a cell with another inmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day.”81 
Seeking both injunctive relief and damages, McKinney “complained of 
certain health problems allegedly caused by exposure to cigarette smoke.”82 
The Ninth Circuit below had found that it was objectively “cruel and unusual 
punishment to house a prisoner in an environment exposing him to levels of 
[environmental tobacco smoke, or secondhand smoke] that pose an unreasonable 
 
is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element 
must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.”). 
77 Id. at 296. 
78 509 U.S. 25 (1993). 
79 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
80 Helling, 509 U.S. at 33. 
81 Id. at 28. 
82 Id. 
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risk of harming his health.”83 The State argued that the Eighth Amendment did 
not apply absent proof of current medical problems caused by the secondhand 
smoke because the Eighth Amendment “does not protect against prison 
conditions that merely threaten to cause health problems in the future, no 
matter how grave and imminent the threat.”84 
The Court disagreed, ultimately citing Hutto in support of its holding that 
the Eighth Amendment protects against exposure to harm.85 The Court 
reiterated Hutto’s holding that the Eighth Amendment provided a remedy for 
prisoners forced to endure cramped isolation cells with other prisoners suffering 
various infectious diseases even absent an allegation that they would suffer 
immediate harm or that the exposure to the diseases would necessarily lead to the 
transfer of infection.86 The Court drew a helpful analogy to illustrate the point: 
“We would think that a prison inmate also could successfully complain about 
demonstrably unsafe drinking water without waiting for an attack of dysentery.”87 
Under Helling, an inmate’s exposure to unsafe conditions that threaten to 
cause health problems in the future is unquestionably a cognizable claim 
under the Eighth Amendment.88 Against the backdrop of the Court’s 
conditions-of-confinement jurisprudence, the Court concluded, “It would be 
odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening 
condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them.”89 
2. Farmer: Reconciling Wilson with Hutto and Rhodes 
The Court next addressed the issue it had left unanswered since Wilson—
namely, the precise scienter standard for prison conditions cases.90 In Farmer 
v. Brennan, the Court adopted a deliberate indifference test under which a 
prison official cannot not be liable under the Eighth Amendment unless he 
disregards “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”91 To meet this 
 
83 Id. at 30 (emphases added). 
84 Id. at 32-33. 
85 Id. at 33. 
86 Id. (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978)). 
87 Id. 
88 See id. (“That the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm to inmates is not a novel 
proposition.”). 
89 Id. 
90 Cozad notes that the Court’s omission of a definition created a problem in the lower courts, 
which were applying varying deliberate indifference standards. See Cozad, supra note 51, at 187-88 
(“The problems created by this omission become evident when one reviews lower court cases 
attempting to apply this standard . . . . [T]he Tenth Circuit . . . requir[ed] . . . ‘actual knowledge of 
impending harm’ . . . . [O]ther circuits allow[ed] knowledge to be imputed . . . . The Third and 
Ninth Circuits appl[ied] a ‘known or should have known’ standard.” (footnotes omitted)). 
91 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Implicitly, the Court also reaffirmed its holding 
in Helling by describing the harm there as “an excessive risk.” Id. at 843. 
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standard, a prison official “must both be aware of facts from which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 
must also draw the inference.”92 
The petitioner in Farmer was a preoperative transsexual who filed a Bivens 
action, claiming prison officials had been deliberately indifferent to his safety 
from sexual attacks by placing him in a penitentiary with “a history of inmate 
assaults, . . . despite knowledge that petitioner, . . . a transsexual who ‘projects 
feminine characteristics,’ would be particularly vulnerable to [such] attack[s].”93 
Within weeks of his transfer from a correctional institute to a penitentiary,94 he 
was beaten and raped by another inmate in his own cell.95 Farmer in turn 
sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief “to 
bar his further confinement in any penitentiary.”96 But the Court rejected 
Farmer’s argument that it should apply a purely objective test,97 instead 
reaffirming its holding in Wilson that Eighth Amendment claims require both 
a subjective and objective showing of culpability.98 The Court ultimately 
remanded the case because the record indicated that the district court below 
erred by basing its conclusion that prison officials were not aware of the 
danger Farmer was facing solely on Farmer’s failure to give “advance notice” 
to the officials regarding his safety concerns.99 
At first blush, Wilson and Farmer may seem inconsistent with the Court’s 
analysis in Hutto and Rhodes—two cases in which a ruling on the objective 
requirement seemingly obviated the need to address the subjective component.100 
However, a footnote in Farmer provides insight into this apparent inconsistency: 
If . . . the evidence before a district court establishes that an inmate faces an 
objectively intolerable risk of serious injury, the defendants could not 
plausibly persist in claiming lack of awareness, any more than prison officials 
who state during the litigation that they will not take reasonable measures to 
 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 831. 
94 While the “record before [the Court was] unclear about the security designations of the two 
prisons [at the time of Farmer’s transfer], penitentiaries are typically higher-security facilities that 
house more troublesome prisoners than federal correctional institutes.” Id. at 830. 
95 Id. 
96 Cozad, supra note 51, at 189. 
97 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“We reject petitioner’s invitation to adopt an objective test for 
deliberate indifference.”). 
98 See id. at 838 (“[I]t was no accident that we said in Wilson and repeated in later cases that 
Eighth Amendment suits against prison officials must satisfy a ‘subjective’ requirement.” (quoting 
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991))). 
99 See id. at 848 (“[T]he failure to give advance notice is not dispositive.”). 
100 See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
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abate an intolerable risk of which they are aware could claim to be subjectively 
blameless . . . .101 
This commentary clarifies an important dynamic with respect to the objective 
and subjective components; namely, that the objectivity of a risk informs the 
plausibility of an official’s claim to ignorance of that risk.102 That is, “if the risk is 
‘longstanding, pervasive, [and] well-documented’ and the circumstances suggest 
that the prison official had been exposed to the information, this could be 
sufficient for a finding that the official had actual knowledge of the risk.”103 
After Farmer, an inmate could be certain of the following: the Eighth 
Amendment offered protection against exposure to the risk of sufficiently serious 
harm and required a demonstration that prison officials were both aware of and 
disregarded that risk. But once prison officials are made aware of objectively 
intolerable risks—because they are pervasive and well-documented or declared so 
by a court of law—prison officials will have difficulty claiming ignorance. 
C. Brown v. Plata: System-Wide Violations 
Prison litigation stagnated for nearly fifteen years following the enactment of 
the PLRA in 1996, which restricted the ability of federal courts to intervene in 
prison conditions cases.104 At the same time, the incarcerated population in the 
United States reached its peak.105 Inmates continued to file federal civil rights 
claims in the lower courts, albeit at a much slower pace,106 but it remained 
unclear what effect the new statutory restrictions, changes in the composition 
of the Court, and time would have on the Court’s prison conditions analysis. 
Then in 2011, the Supreme Court took one of the most significant Eighth 
Amendment prison conditions cases to date.107 In Brown v. Plata, the Court 
 
101 511 U.S. at 846 n.9. 
102 The Court also alluded to this relationship in Wilson. There, the Court attributed the 
absence of an intent discussion in Hutto to the inherent punitive intent of punitive isolation. 
Newman, supra note 72. Thus, the Court reasoned that the objective harm informed the subjective analysis. 
103 Gutterman, supra note 54, at 394-95 (alteration in original) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 
114 S. Ct. 1970, 1981 (1994)).  
104 See infra subsection IV.A.2. 
105 See GLAZE & PARKS, supra note 3, tbl.2 (showing that the number of incarcerated 
individuals grew from 1,937,500 in 2000 to 2,239,800 in 2011). For a discussion about the relationship 
between overcrowding and the enactment of the PLRA, see generally Elizabeth Alexander, A 
Troubling Response to Overcrowded Prisons: The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 3 CIV. RTS. J., Fall 
1998, at 25. 
106 See Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 153, 156 (2015) (“In 1996, the PLRA immediately transformed the litigation 
landscape. After a very steep decline in both filings and filing rates in 1996 and 1997, rates continued 
to shrink for another decade (although the increasing incarcerated population meant that the 
resulting number of filings increased a bit).”). 
107 See Schlanger, supra note 2, at 165 (noting that the case “marked an important milestone in 
American institutional reform litigation”). 
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affirmed a district court order requiring California to reduce its prison 
population as a remedy for the extensive and longstanding constitutional 
deficiencies in its prisons.108 For the first time since 1978, and despite the 
PLRA’s cabining of judicial oversight of prison administration, “the Court 
ratified a lower court’s crowding-related order in a . . . prison case.”109 
The Plata litigation started as two separate cases, with each class of plaintiffs 
alleging that overcrowding created unconstitutional conditions in their respective 
prisons.110 At time of trial, California’s prisons had been operating at 
approximately 200% of design capacity for about eleven years.111 A three-judge 
court, specially convened under the authority of the PLRA, presided over the 
consolidated cases.112 That panel ordered California to reduce its prison 
population to 135.7% of design capacity within two years.113 In reviewing the 
panel’s decision, the Court pointed to the abhorrent living conditions created 
by chronic overcrowding in California prisons, including, 
• 200 prisoners living in a gymnasium, monitored by as few as 
two or three correctional officers;114 
• as many as fifty-four prisoners sharing a single toilet;115 
• suicidal inmates being “held for prolonged periods of time in 
telephone-booth-sized cages without toilets;”116 
• a suicide rate nearly eighty percent higher than the national 
average for prison populations;117 
• up to fifty sick inmates being held together in a “twelve-by-
twenty–foot cage for up to five hours awaiting [medical] 
treatment;”118 
• and worst of all, the fact that “on average, an inmate in one 
of California’s prisons needlessly die[d] every six to seven 
 
108 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011). 
109 Schlanger, supra note 2, at 165. 
110 Plata, 563 U.S. at 500. 
111 Id. at 502. 
112 Id. at 509. 
113 Id. at 509-10. 
114 Id. at 502. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 503; see also id. at 504 (“A psychiatric expert reported observing an inmate who had 
been held in such a cage for nearly 24 hours, standing in a pool of his own urine, unresponsive and 
nearly catatonic. Prison officials explained they had ‘no place to put him.’”). 
117 Id.; see also id. (“[A] court-appointed Special Master found that 72.1% of suicides involved 
‘some measure of inadequate assessment, treatment, or intervention, and were therefore most 
probably foreseeable and/or preventable.’”). 
118 Id. 
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days due to constitutional deficiencies in the . . . medical 
delivery system”—or, one death per week.119 
California’s prison system easily satisfied the objective requirement of the 
prison conditions analysis. In addition to the ongoing health and safety risks, 
inmates routinely contracted serious illnesses, and the prison experienced a 
number of preventable deaths. Notably, the Court did not base its holding on 
deficiencies in providing care on any single occasion. Rather, operating within 
the future harm framework,120 the Court found that the conditions in California 
prisons constituted systemwide violations that subjected all inmates to a 
substantial risk of being denied medical care.121 
It is less obvious, given Wilson and Farmer, how the Court resolved the 
subjective analysis. It seems likely that the Court ultimately bypassed this analysis 
based on the relationship between the objective and subjective requirements, 
explained by the Court in Farmer.122 That is, after more than a decade of 
litigation, California prison officials could not plausibly plead ignorance to 
the serious deprivations taking place under their watch. Moreover, the State 
arguably conceded knowledge of the persisting unconstitutional conditions 
via its request for more time to comply with previous orders.123 Still, for 
purposes of this Comment, it is instructive to review the subjective prong 
inquiry conducted by one of the lower courts in one of the cases eventually 
consolidated in Plata before the litigation itself arguably rendered the 
question moot.124 
 
119 Id. at 507-08. 
120 See id. at 532 (“Relief targeted only at present members of the plaintiff classes may therefore 
fail to adequately protect future class members who will develop serious physical or mental illness.” 
(emphases added));  see also supra Section II.B (summarizing case law utilizing the future harm framework). 
121 See id. at 545 (“The medical and mental health care provided by California’s prisons falls 
below the standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment.”). Justice Scalia, however, 
rejected the Court’s holding, arguing that “a court may not order the release of prisoners who have 
suffered no violations of their constitutional rights, merely to make it less likely that that will happen 
to them in the future.” Id. at 563 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Scalia, “[T]he persons who 
have a constitutional claim for denial of medical care are those who are denied medical care—not all 
who face a ‘substantial risk’ (whatever that is) of being denied medical care.” Id. at 551. 
122 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
123 Plata, 563 U.S. at 513 (majority opinion) (“The State contends that it was error to convene 
the three-judge court without affording it more time to comply with the prior orders in Coleman 
and Plata.”). 
124 Justice Alito’s dissent in Plata criticized the majority’s reliance on Coleman for the subjective 
prong evidence, citing Farmer and Helling for the proposition that deliberate indifference must be 
examined “‘in light of the prison authorities’ current attitudes and conduct,’ which means . . . ‘at the 
time suit is brought and persisting thereafter.’” Id. at 567 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) 
(first quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993); then quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 845 (1994)). He also noted that the three-judge panel in Coleman “relied heavily on 
outdated information and findings and refused to permit California to introduce new evidence,” id. 
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The analysis in Coleman v. Wilson took up the Farmer Court’s observation 
that prison officials could not claim ignorance to obvious and known risks.125 
In Coleman, prisoners suffering from serious mental diseases brought suit in 
the Eastern District of California, seeking both declaratory and injunctive 
relief.126 The defendant-officials included, among others, then–Governor of 
California Pete Wilson, then–Assistant Deputy Director for Health Care 
Services for the California Department of Corrections (CDC), Dr. Nadim 
Khoury, and then–Chief of Psychiatric Services for CDC, Dr. John Zil.127 
After finding the plaintiff-inmates had met the objective component of their 
cruel and unusual prison conditions claim, citing many of the same detestable 
circumstances that persisted through the 2011 Plata litigation,128 the court 
turned to the knowledge requirement. The Coleman court noted that the 
officials bore the burden of proving their ignorance129 and then addressed each 
of the respondent’s deliberate indifference defenses, in turn. 
First, putting the defendant’s arguments in context, the court reiterated that 
CDC inmates faced “objectively intolerable” risks: “seriously mentally ill inmates 
ha[d] languished for months, or even years, without access to necessary care[,] 
. . . suffer[ed] from severe hallucinations, . . . decompensate[d] into catatonic 
states, and . . . suffer[ed] the other sequela to untreated mental disease.”130 Next, 
the court addressed Dr. Khoury’s and Dr. Zil’s defense that they could not be 
considered deliberately indifferent to these serious risks and injuries because 
they lacked “power or authority to change any aspect of the delivery of mental 
health care to inmates.”131 Rejecting this argument on two grounds, the court 
first noted that “even if true, . . . lack of power does not necessarily 
contraindicate scienter.”132 Second, the court concluded that the evidence 
indicating the doctors had no authority to hire additional medical personnel 
“[did] not speak to the many other areas within the scope of [their] authority that 
affect[ed] the delivery of constitutionally adequate care to class members.”133 
 
at 567, and that the majority “repeat[ed] the lower court’s error of reciting statistics that [we]re 
clearly out of date.” Id. at 567, 570. 
125 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
126 Id. at 1293. 
127 Id. 
128 The court cited, for example, a magistrate judge’s prior factual findings of “‘significant and 
unacceptable delays’ in inmate access . . . to mental health care;” inadequate medication 
management; inadequate implementation of a suicide-watch program; and ultimately, “a systemic 
failure to provide adequate mental health care [to] thousands of class members [who] suffer[ed] 
present injury and [were] threatened with great injury in the future.” Id. at 1308-09, 1315. 
129 The court cited the reasoning in Farmer for this proposition. Id. at 1316 (citing Farmer v. 
Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1982 (1994)). 
130 Id. at 1317. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
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Finally, the court rebuffed defendant Wilson’s contention that there was 
no evidence establishing his knowledge of the long-standing systemic 
deficiencies. Given Wilson’s “official responsibilities,” the court found his plea 
of ignorance regarding information with which the Governor was “duty 
bound to be familiar . . . [to be] remarkable.”134 The court found that in any 
event, Wilson failed to support his assertion that he was unaware of the 
evidence received during the case, including a report “produced pursuant to 
a legislative mandate” and another commissioned by the CDC itself.135 Citing 
Farmer, the court found Wilson’s claimed lack of awareness following “five 
years of litigati[on]” to be implausible.136 
III. APPLYING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
This Part applies the prison conditions framework set forth in Part II to 
assess potential inmate claims against SCI Fayette and USP Letcher. The 
first step is to identify the specific harm or deprivation at issue under the 
objective prong. The ALC’s investigation of SCI Fayette produced evidence 
that satisfies this prong and demonstrates that inmates’ constant exposure to 
toxic coal sites constitutes sufficiently serious and intolerable conditions.137 
These findings have implications beyond SCI Fayette. Prisons contracted for 
locations with similar environmental profiles—such as USP Letcher—pose 
comparable risks for future inmates.138 These imminent hazards raise Eighth 
Amendment concerns under the future harm analysis first articulated in Helling.139 
The second step is the subjective inquiry, required in every case involving 
allegedly cruel and usual prison conditions under Wilson.140 The objective–
subjective dynamic described by the Court in Farmer141 and the application 
of that logic in Coleman, which was ultimately adopted in Plata,142 indicate 
that scienter can be established through evidence that a particular risk was well-
documented and longstanding.143 SCI Fayette officials are well aware that the 
prison’s proximity to the coal ash dump has been linked to serious and ongoing 
 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. (citing Farmer, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1984 n.9 (1994)). 
137 See infra text accompanying note 155; see also supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra text accompanying note 15.  
139 See supra subsection II.B.1. 
140  See supra text accompanying notes 74–77. 
141 See supra text accompanying note 101.  
142 The Court adopted this logic insofar as it agreed the conditions violated the Eighth 
Amendment. In other words, if the Court did not accept Coleman’s subjective prong analysis, a 
requisite component of all prison conditions claims, one would expect, at the very least, a discussion 
of that issue. If the Court did not agree that the subjective prong was satisfied, it could not, under 
Wilson, have found the conditions violated the Eighth Amendment. 
143 See supra text accompanying note 103.  
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inmate health problems: prisoners’ rights organizations have sent specific and 
detailed information to the BOP chronicling the risks inherent to the prison’s 
location,144 which has also caught the attention of various media outlets.145 
Officials responsible for the bidding and contracting of USP Letcher are likewise 
well-informed of the risks posed by the prison’s planned location atop a coal mine. 
In addition to letters and reports from various human rights organizations,146 the 
construction plans have been the subject of public debate and protest.147 
Ultimately, however, the following application brings to light a mismatch 
between the subjective prong of the prison conditions analysis, as it has been 
developed by the Court, and suits seeking injunctive relief. While the scienter 
requirement may perform an important limiting function with respect to 
claims for damages based on past injury, it does no such work when applied 
to actions for prospective relief. This mismatch is particularly conspicuous 
when prison officials and guards are themselves subjected to and complain of 
the very same conditions to which a prisoner’s claim is addressed. 
 
144 See, e.g., Letter from Paul Wright, Exec. Dir., Human Rights Def. Ctr., to Isaac Gaston, 
Site Selection Specialist, Bureau of Prisons 7 & n.27 (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.humanrights
defensecenter.org/media/publications/Letcher%20Co%20KY%20HRDC%20comment%20on%20B
OP%20Draft%20EIS%203-30-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWS4-FTFP] [hereinafter HRDC Letter 
to BOP] (citing the ALC’s report following its investigation at SCI Fayette for the proposition that 
“[p]risons located near coal mining waste facilities can result in widespread prisoner health problems”).  
145 See, e.g., Benny Becker, The Prison Builder’s Dilemma: Economics and Ethics Clash in Eastern 
Kentucky, WOUB DIGITAL (Aug. 1, 2016), http://woub.org/2016/08/01/the-prison-builders-dilemma-
economics-and-ethics-clash-in-eastern-kentucky/ [https://perma.cc/9J6H-G4N6] (recounting the 
intense debates among the local community about “what role prisons should play in the region’s 
future”); Alejandro Davila Fragoso & Carimah Townes, Kentucky Lawmakers Want to Revitalize Coal 
County by Building a Prison, THINKPROGRESS (June 16, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/kentucky-
lawmakers-want-to-revitalize-coal-country-by-building-a-prison-73e2b5c1e166#.f6t8k23ga [https://
perma.cc/7SE9-G2N7] (describing how the “dangerous—and sometimes deadly—toxins” associated 
with mountaintop coal removal sites such as the planned Letcher County facility will put “[a]ny 
prisoners confined there . . . at risk of exposure and a long list of chronic health problems”); Bill 
Estep, Supporters Hope Construction of $444 Million Prison in Letcher County Starts This Year, 
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Feb. 25, 2016, 4:52 P.M.), http://www.kentucky.com/news/state/
article62492807.html [https://perma.cc/F4F4-33NQ] (reporting that “[s]everal groups have argued [that] 
the Bureau of Prisons did not do an adequate environmental assessment” of the Letcher County site). 
146 See HRDC Letter to BOP, supra note 144, at 7 (objecting to the BOP’s Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) filed for the prison because “[d]espite the self-evident concerns that arise 
from housing over 1,200 people at a former mining site surrounded by active coal mines, the EIS is 
completely devoid of any discussion on potential impacts to prisoners”). 
147 See, e.g., John Washington, When Prisons Are Toxic to Both Humanity and the Environment, IN 
THESE TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://inthesetimes.com/article/19264/coal-and-unusual-punishment 
[https://perma.cc/4PSH-V5ZY] (describing activists’ march to the BOP’s D.C. headquarters to 
protest “[t]he construction of prisons and jails on toxic sites[,] . . . a widespread, but typically 
overlooked, problem”). 
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A. Objective Requirement: The Evidence 
1. SCI Fayette 
The experience of inmates at SCI Fayette and the evidence corroborating 
those experiences demonstrate the broader point that prisons built on toxic 
waste sites—and particularly on coal mine sites—result in objectively cruel 
and unusual prison conditions. SCI Fayette is a maximum-security prison 
connected to an adjacent coal waste dump.148 Surrounded by “about 40 million 
tons of waste, two coal slurry ponds, and millions of cubic yards of coal 
combustion waste,” SCI Fayette is “inescapably situated in the midst of a 
massive toxic waste dump.”149 Exposure to toxic coal waste has been shown to 
cause elevated risk for urinary tract cancer, increased blood pressure, lung 
cancer, anemia, stomach cancer, skin ulcers, asthma and wheezing, nose ulcers, 
nervous system damage, hypertension, vomiting and diarrhea, paralysis, and 
even death.150 
The ALC has persuasively argued that conditions at SCI Fayette satisfy 
the objective requirements of the Eighth Amendment prison conditions 
analysis.151 In response to increasing reports of adverse health symptoms by 
inmates, the ALC, in coordination with the Human Rights Coalition (HRC)152 
and the Center for Coalfield Justice (CCJ),153 launched an investigation into the 
declining health of prisoners at SCI Fayette and its connection to environmental 
pollution.154 The report that ensued, No Escape: Exposure to Toxic Coal Waste at 
State Correctional Institution Fayette, compiled the preliminary findings gleaned 
from interviews with SCI Fayette inmates and the related investigation. The 
results showed that prisoners were experiencing abnormally high rates of illnesses 
 
148 Emily Atkin, 40 Million Tons of Toxic Coal Waste Sit Next to Prison with ‘Alarming Rates of 
Illness,’ THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.skidmore.edu/~bturner/Prisons%20_ED_
strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ULX-X74T]. 
149 MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150 See GOTTLIEB ET AL., supra note 33, at 1-4 (summarizing the “effects on the human body 
that can be caused by exposure to nine of the most common toxic contaminants in coal ash”); see also 
id. at 5 fig.1 (depicting the health impacts of coal toxicants and the specific body parts affected by the 
various toxicants). 
151 See MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 18 (“[A]n injury to a prisoner’s health caused by exposure 
to environmentally toxic living conditions such as those present at SCI Fayette meets the objective 
requirement of an Eighth Amendment claim, provided that the harm is ‘sufficiently serious.’”). 
152 The Human Rights Coalition is a statewide prisoners’ rights group headquartered in 
Pennsylvania, predominantly made up of “prisoners’ families, prisoners, ex-offenders, and supporters.” 
About HRC, HUM. RTS. COALITION, http://hrcoalition.org/about [https://perma.cc/HD98-DPS9]. 
153 The Center for Coalfield Justice is a Pennsylvania based–environmental justice group, 
whose mission is “[t]o improve policy and regulations for the oversight of fossil fuel extraction and 
use . . . and to protect public and environmental health.” What We Do, CTR. FOR COALFIELD JUST., 
http://coalfieldjustice.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/BXQ3-YXMF]. 
154 MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 1. 
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“revealing a pattern of symptomatic clusters consistent with exposure to toxic coal 
waste.”155 The findings demonstrate a correlation between inmates’ reported 
symptoms and those typically associated with prolonged exposure to toxic coal 
waste.156 Specifically, 
• More than 81% of responding prisoners (61/75) reported respiratory, 
throat, and sinus conditions, including shortness of breath, chronic 
coughing, sinus infections, lung infections, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, extreme swelling of the throat, as well as sores, 
cysts, and tumors in the nose, mouth, and throat.   
• 68% (51/75) of responding prisoners experienced gastrointestinal 
problems, including heart burn, stomach pains, diarrhea, ulcers, 
ulcerative colitis, bloody stools, and vomiting.   
• 52% (39/75) reported experiencing adverse skin conditions, including 
painful rashes, hives, cysts, and abscesses.   
• 12% (9/75) of prisoners reported either being diagnosed with a thyroid 
disorder at SCI Fayette, or having existing thyroid problems exacerbated 
after transfer to the prison. 
• Eleven prisoners died from cancer at SCI Fayette between January 
2010 and December of 2013. Another six prisoners have reported 
being diagnosed with cancer at SCI Fayette, and a further eight 
report undiagnosed tumors and lumps.157   
These findings, while certainly relevant, ultimately leave causality unverified. 
Prisoners, for example, may experience disproportionately poor health as a 
demographic, rather than by virtue of specific environmental factors.158 But 
while causality is “extremely difficult to prove . . . in these types of situations,”159 
the ALC provides an instructive point of comparison: “Unlike reports of health 
problems from prisoners at other Pennsylvania . . . prisons, most SCI Fayette 
prisoners discuss symptoms and illnesses that did not emerge until they arrived 
 
155 Id. 
156 Id. The ALC reports that typical symptoms of such exposure include “respiratory, throat 
and sinus conditions; skin irritation and rashes; gastrointestinal tract problems; pre-cancerous 
growths and cancer; thyroid disorders; other symptoms such as eye irritation, blurred vision, 
headaches, dizziness, hair loss, weight loss, fatigue, and loss of mental focus and concentration.” Id. 
157 Id. at 1-2. 
158 See LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & MARCUS BERZOFSKY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
NCJ 248941, MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 
2011–12, 1 (rev. 2016) (finding that “inmates were more likely than the general population to report 
ever having a chronic condition of infectious disease”). 
159 Markowitz, supra note 8. 
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at SCI Fayette.”160 The ALC ultimately concluded that “the declining health 
of prisoners at SCI Fayette is indeed caused by the toxic environment 
surrounding the prison,” but conceded that confirming this relationship 
would require “[a] substantial mobilization of resources for continued 
investigation.”161 
Applying the prison conditions case law to these preliminary findings, the 
ALC determined that the conditions at SCI Fayette could satisfy the 
objective requirement in either of two ways. First, the conditions violate the 
Eighth Amendment given the harms that inmates are currently experiencing. 
The current state of affairs is “sufficiently serious” so as to deprive inmates of 
an identifiable human need—namely, non-poisonous living conditions.162 In 
other words, the deprivations at SCI Fayette are closer to the punitive 
isolation in Hutto than they are to the double celling in Rhodes. Present harm 
could thus be established “[i]f the coal refuse and ash pollution surrounding 
SCI Fayette can be proven to a reasonable scientific certainty to be the cause 
of an individual’s ill health.”163 
Second, these conditions violate the Eighth Amendment’s objectivity 
requirement on an exposure theory. An inmate need not “await a tragic event” 
before bringing an Eighth Amendment claim.164 As the ALC submits, “If a 
body of evidence can be developed showing that any prisoner at SCI Fayette 
is being exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm based on the possibility 
that he will develop a ‘sufficiently serious’ health problem, the state will be 
constitutionally prohibited from confining prisoners [there].”165 Like the 
exposure to infectious disease in Hutto and the exposure to secondhand smoke 
in Helling, exposure to toxic coal waste at SCI Fayette could prove an intolerable 
risk of harm to inmates there. 
 
160 MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 2 (emphasis added). 
161 Id. Necessary resources in a suit brought against the prison would include expert analysis 
and testimony, “including studies by epidemiologists and environmental toxicologists.” Id. at 19. The 
ALC posits that the “evidence gathered to date” provides “a sound basis for seeking financial and 
scientific resources that will enable prisoners and their advocates to develop evidence of the potential 
and actual harms imposed on them.” Id. 
162 Id. at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 
163 Id. 
164 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). 
165 MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 18-19. This logic was endorsed by the Court in Plata. 
See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 532 (2011) (“Relief targeted only at present members of the plaintiff 
classes may therefore fail to adequately protect future class members who will develop serious 
physical or mental illness.”). 
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2. Letcher County 
USP Letcher presents unique Eighth Amendment issues because the 
prison has not yet been built.166 Currently, there are no inmates in Letcher 
County being exposed to substantially serious health risks. However, the 
reasoning behind the future harm holdings—that “[i]t would be odd to deny 
an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening 
condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to 
them”167—forms the doctrinal basis for enjoining the construction of a prison 
in an environmentally hazardous location. It is difficult to imagine that the 
future harm analysis would distinguish between current exposure at SCI 
Fayette and inevitable exposure at USP Letcher. 
The environmental circumstances of Roxana, the community in which 
officials plan to build the Letcher County prison,168 are strikingly similar to 
those of LaBelle, Pennsylvania, home to SCI Fayette. Like LaBelle, Roxana 
has been significantly impacted by coal mining activities.169 Indeed, Letcher 
County may prove to be an even more troublesome location than LaBelle, as 
it is “in the heart of central Appalachian coalfields,” which had been extracting 
coal from the “most accessible” seams for decades.170 Thus, USP Letcher 
presents future inmates with a nearly identical risk of exposure to coal 
toxicants that inmates at SCI Fayette already endure. The causal link between 
toxic exposure and negative health impacts are also potentially stronger in 
Letcher County, as researchers have found that “[a]mong West Virginia 
adults, residential proximity to heavy coal production was associated with 
poorer health status and with higher risk for cardiopulmonary disease, chronic 
lung disease, hypertension, and kidney disease,” even after controlling for 
other contributing factors such as smoking, obesity, age, gender, income, 
education, and the “presence or absence of health insurance.”171 
 
166 As of August 1, 2016, “[t]he Bureau of Prisons has not yet issued a final decision [as to 
whether and when the prison will be built],” but the federal budget does include a $444 million 
allocation.” Becker, supra note 145. 
167 Helling, 509 U.S. at 33. 
168 See Casper-Peak, supra note 39. 
169 See CAPACITY PLANNING AND CONSTR. BRANCH, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, REVISED 
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR PROPOSED UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY 
AND FEDERAL PRISON CAMP: LETCHER COUNTY, KENTUCKY § 5.2.1 (2016) (“The topography 
at the Roxana site has been significantly impacted by mountaintop removal coal mining.”). 
170 Becker, supra note 145. 
171 Michael Hendryx & Melissa M. Ahern, Relations Between Health Indicators and Residential 
Proximity to Coal Mining in West Virginia, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 669, 669-70 (2008). 
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In its March 2015 letter to the BOP, the HRDC enumerated the risks a 
prison in Roxana could pose to its future occupants.172 These risks mirror those 
of SCI Fayette: respiratory illness, gastrointestinal problems, dermatological 
conditions, thyroid disorders, and higher cancer mortality rates.173 Indeed, 
numerous studies corroborate the serious health hazards associated with exposure 
to areas heavily impacted by coal mining.174 
A suit to enjoin a not-yet-constructed prison based on cruel and unusual 
conditions requires an extension of the reasoning in Hutto, Helling, and Plata. 
In each of these cases, exposure to and risk of future harm created by prison 
conditions formed the basis of the Eighth Amendment claim; actual harm 
was immaterial. In Hutto, the Court agreed with the lower court that exposure 
to infectious disease through close confinement and the indiscriminate 
redistribution of mattresses between sick and healthy inmates required a 
constitutional remedy.175 In Helling, exposing an inmate to the health risks 
that come with sharing a cell with a five-pack-a-day smoker was held 
unconstitutional.176 In Plata, the extreme deficiencies and inadequacies of the 
prison’s medical delivery system created an intolerable risk of harm to all 
inmates, systemwide.177 
These cases have profound implications for the planned Letcher County 
construction. Currently, no inmates face conditions giving rise to an intolerable 
risk of harm, but they soon will. In light of the Court’s future harm cases, it would 
be odd to prohibit an injunction until an inmate is actually exposed to the harm. 
 
172 See HRDC Letter to BOP, supra note 144 , at 7 (“Scientific literature makes clear that there 
are health risks connected with simply living in proximity to coal mining, especially surface mines 
that are common in Eastern Kentucky.”). 
173 Id. In fact, the HRDC cited the ALC’s Report on SCI Fayette to explain that “prisons 
located near coal mining waste facilities can result in widespread prisoner health problems.” Id. at 7 
& n.27. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text for a description of the health issues that 
prisoners at SCI Fayette experience. 
174 See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION & NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY AND HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 
64, COAL MINE DUST EXPOSURES AND ASSOCIATED HEALTH OUTCOMES: A REVIEW OF 
INFORMATION PUBLISHED SINCE 1995, at 32 (2011) (concluding that “every effort needs to be made 
to reduce exposures . . . to . . . coal mine dust”); Michael Hendryx & Melissa M. Ahern, Mortality 
in Appalachian Coal Mining Regions: The Value of Statistical Life Lost, 124 PUB. HEALTH REP. 541, 547 
(2009) (finding that “mortality rates were higher every year from 1979 through 2005 in Appalachian 
coal mining areas compared with other areas of Appalachia or the nation,” with the “highest 
mortality rates in areas with the highest levels of mining”). 
175 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1978). 
176 See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (“McKinney states a cause of action under 
the Eighth Amendment by alleging that petitioners have . . . exposed him to levels of ETS that pose 
an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.”). 
177 See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 531 (2011) (“Even prisoners with no present . . . illness 
may become afflicted, and all prisoners in California are at risk so long as the State continues to 
provide inadequate care.”). 
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Rather, the risk becomes sufficiently imminent to substantiate a claim once the 
first inmate is sentenced to serve time at USP Letcher.178 
Enjoining operations before prisoners begin serving time is the necessary 
remedy. As the Court noted in Plata, systemwide relief is required where 
“[r]elief targeted only at the present members of the plaintiff class[]”—here, the 
first inmate(s) booked or perhaps planned for transfer to USP Letcher—“may 
. . . fail to adequately protect future class members who will develop serious 
physical or mental illness.”179 Before long, more than 1100 inmates locked in the 
Letcher County prison will be subjected to the same or similar risks facing the 
prisoners currently housed at SCI Fayette.180 The only remedy to preclude their 
exposure to these unconstitutional conditions of confinement is a wholesale 
shutting down of operations. 
B. Subjective Test: Deliberately Indifferent Design 
1. SCI Fayette 
In its report on SCI Fayette, the ALC also analyzed the subjective prong 
of the prison conditions framework, noting that the law requires proof that 
prison officials failed to take measures to eliminate known risks to prisoners’ 
health.181 In accordance with the Court’s objective–subjective dynamic noted 
in Farmer, the ALC believes that medical records and prisoner grievances 
could create a sufficient record of knowledge to show that Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections (PADOC) officials knew of or should have known 
of health risks associated with the prison’s location.182 Crucially, the ALC also 
maintained that “PADOC officials’ awareness that SCI Fayette was built on 
and around a toxic dump would demonstrate actual knowledge of a risk of 
adverse health consequences from imprisoning people at the site.”183 This 
second point has broad implications for the future of the current framework 
in that it provides an avenue for litigants to prove subjective intent even 
before a single individual (i.e., a guard or an inmate) is exposed to toxic 
conditions—in other words, proof of deliberately indifferent design.184 The 
 
178 The future harm strategy introduces questions of standing and ripeness. See infra subsection IV.A.1. 
179 Plata, 563 U.S. at 532. 
180 See Estep, supra note 145 (noting that the prison will house 1200 inmates). 
181 MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 17, at 19. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Here, I expand on the idea of “prisons designed with deliberate indifference,” coined by 
Jonathan Simon, to refer to “hyper-overcrowding” in California prisons. See SIMON, supra note 2, 
at 6-7 (noting that the combination of various factors produced “a toxic cocktail: an epidemic of 
chronic disease and mental illness among prisoners combined with permanent hyper-overcrowding 
in prisons designed with deliberate indifference to the humanity of their occupants”). 
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argument proceeds as follows: officials’ ex ante knowledge that a prison is 
being constructed on a toxic waste site satisfies the deliberate indifference 
standard by virtue of their disregard for the inevitable harms that follow from 
housing inmates in such a location. 
The viability of a deliberately indifferent design theory is significant in 
this context because it locates prison officials’ intent prior to operation. This, 
in turn, would have major implications for the applicability of the Eighth 
Amendment to prison siting and construction as inevitable precursors to 
unconstitutional prison conditions. 
2. Letcher County 
A claim to enjoin USP Letcher construction under the Eighth 
Amendment could succeed on the theory that the prison is being designed 
with deliberate indifference to its future occupants. Litigants could offer 
evidence that various studies and reports have alerted officials to the hazards 
of the planned location. For example, evidence that the HRDC alerted relevant 
officials to the situation at SCI Fayette demonstrates the officials’ disregard for 
known and realized risks associated with construction on sites affected by coal 
mining.185 Their decision to move forward notwithstanding this and other 
information could play a significant role in the subjective prong analysis. 
This strategy is an amplification of the Court’s discussion in Farmer about 
the requisite plausibility of a lack of knowledge defense.186 There, the Court 
held that the prison-official defendants, following years of litigation that 
included a long discovery period, could not plausibly claim ignorance of 
substantial health risks to inmates. In Plata, the Court relied on similar logic 
when it accepted the lower court’s finding that California officials could not 
claim ignorance after being made aware of the risks to inmates through 
reports tendered by the plaintiff-inmates. 
Various human rights, social, and environmental justice organizations 
have explored the constitutional and policy implications of prisons built on 
toxic waste sites.187 This information is not only publicly available but, in 
some instances, has been addressed directly to the prison officials tasked with 
managing correctional facilities in the United States.188 The officials responsible 
 
185 See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
186 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
187 See, e.g., Laura L. Cepero, Toxic Traps: Environmental Hazards Threaten Two Federal 
Supermax Prisons, COUNTERPUNCH (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/09/08/
toxic-traps-environmental-hazards-threaten-two-federal-supermax-prisons/ [http://perma.cc/L6
3H-3GPU] (“A Solitary Watch investigation into the sites of the federal government’s two 
‘supermax’ facilities—the first open for two decades, the second slated to open soon—reveals a 
number of possible serious environmental hazards.”). 
188 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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for vetting, planning, and designing the Letcher County prison—like Governor 
Wilson in Coleman—have a duty to be familiar with such information.189 Even 
absent an explicit duty, however, officials could hardly deny actual knowledge of 
the risks that inmates will face living atop a former coal mine. 
A deliberate indifference design theory allows plaintiffs to argue that 
officials who proceed with construction in the face of knowledge that 
constructing a prison in a given location carried serious health risks may not 
then claim ignorance of those risks. Although this theory would extend the 
current framework, the Court’s prison conditions jurisprudence supports 
such an expansion. Given that “[i]t would be odd to deny an injunction to 
inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their 
prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them,”190 it seems 
equally odd to deny an injunction to plaintiffs who can prove that the prison 
to which they have been sentenced will expose them to life-threatening 
conditions merely because nothing has happened yet. 
3. Subjectivity and Prospective Relief: An Uneasy Fit 
While I have endeavored to show that plaintiffs seeking an injunction can 
meet the subjective element of a deliberate indifference claim, there are 
reasons to question whether the subjective prong should even apply in 
prospective relief cases. For example, the subjective test would likely preclude 
an Eighth Amendment damages claim brought by an inmate injured in an 
accidental boiler explosion. And indeed, assuming proper maintenance and 
assuming that the prison was not aware the boiler would explode, this appears 
to be the correct result. The injury could not properly be considered 
“punishment.” This logic, however, does not apply if the boiler has repeatedly 
exploded. Once a court is satisfied that the risk of future explosions is sufficiently 
serious, prison officials’ state of mind should not matter. Surely no official hoped 
that the boiler would explode. Whether officials knew of and disregarded that 
risk is immaterial with respect to whether the boiler should be removed.191 
However, the absence of intent has no conceivable bearing on the objective risk 
the boiler continues to pose. The injunctive question—whether the boiler should 
be removed as a cruel and unusual living condition—is answered by the 
 
189 Under federal law, the BOP, “under the direction of the Attorney General,” is charged with 
“protecti[ng],” providing “suitable quarters” for, and ensuring “the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all 
persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2)–(3) (2012). 
190 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). 
191 The awkwardness of the deliberate indifference application in this hypothetical illustrates 
how the subjective inquiry does not map well onto circumstances calling for prospective relief.  
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objective inquiry alone. That is, the risk of explosion alone determines 
whether relief should be granted prospectively.192 
The boiler example highlights another practical challenge of applying a 
knowledge requirement in this context—specifically, that many risky conditions 
threaten both inmates and guards. This conundrum is especially pronounced 
with respect to toxic prison locations. The relevance of the subjective inquiry is 
particularly strained in this context because officials are also adversely affected by 
constant exposure to contaminated air, fugitive dust, and poor ventilation. While 
the subjective inquiry impliedly assumes that guards and inmates will be on 
opposite sides of the given condition (i.e., it presupposes guard-on-inmate 
violence), the environmental context demonstrates the error in this supposition. 
In fact, a number of guards working in SCI Fayette have developed 
illnesses similar to those contracted by inmates.193 This development has 
prompted the union representing state corrections officers to “conduct a 
health survey of present and former members working at SCI Fayette and 
three other prisons built near coal ash disposal or coal mining operations.”194 
Eric Garland, a guard inside the prison, was diagnosed with hyperthyroidism 
in 2010.195 Garland recalled that other prison guards “have contracted kidney 
cancer, a not very common cancer that can [be] linked to the consumption of 
cadmium and arsenic.”196 As for his own condition, Garland reports, “The 
medicine I take helps it, but I worry about cancer a good bit.”197 
In sum, the Court’s reasoning in the prison conditions cases supports the 
concept of deliberately indifferent design as an avenue for litigants to satisfy the 
 
192 This distinction—in fact, this hypothetical—was considered and rejected by the Court in Wilson: 
[Petitioner] acknowledges . . . that if a prison boiler malfunctions accidentally during 
a cold winter, an inmate would have no basis for an Eighth Amendment claim, even if 
he suffers objectively significant harm. Petitioner, and the United States as amicus 
curiae in support of petitioner, suggests that we should draw a distinction between 
“short-term” or “one-time” conditions (in which a state-of-mind requirement would 
apply) and “continuing” or “systemic” conditions (where official state of mind would 
be irrelevant). We perceive neither a logical nor a practical basis for that distinction. 
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (citation omitted). In light of subsequent decisions, 
however, this distinction merits reexamination. In this context, the distinction between “one-time” 
and “systemic” is not necessarily based on the temporality or frequency of the condition, but whether 
the remedy necessary to cure the constitutional defect is retrospective or prospective. 
193 See Don Hopey, State, Corrections Union Investigate Health at Prisons by Coal Sites, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 17, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/sou
th/2014/09/17/Officials-investigate-health-at-prisons-by-coal-sites/stories/201409170030 [https://perma.cc/P
W9L-VAB9] (noting that several guards at SCI Fayette had contracted of “kidney, thyroid and 
breast cancers”). 
194 Id. 
195  Rakia, supra note 14. 
196 Williams, supra note 41 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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scienter requirement even before they are actually exposed to life-threatening 
environmental conditions. But this is a hoop through which plaintiff-inmates 
should not have to jump. The intent requirement developed by the Court in the 
later prison conditions cases proves an uneasy fit when applied to prospective relief 
cases. While it is unclear why officials’ subjective intent should have any bearing on 
the question of whether an existing condition should be remedied, it is particularly 
perplexing to require such a showing when guards themselves are subject to the 
same life-threatening conditions. 
IV. LIMITATIONS AND SOLUTIONS 
The viability of an Eighth Amendment claim to enjoin the construction 
of a prison on land with serious and known environmental risks depends in 
part on where the claim is litigated—state or federal court. In federal court, there 
are two primary limitations that make success unlikely: justiciability requirements, 
including standing and ripeness, and the PLRA. In contrast, state courts are bound 
by neither the demanding standing and ripeness requirements for federal claims 
nor the strictures of the federal PLRA, making them the better alternative, albeit 
with their own limitations and complications. While state courts cannot 
intervene in the administration of federal facilities, the vast majority of 
inmates are housed in state prisons and local jails.198 State courts are also 
better situated to address the practical challenges facing prison 
administrators, such as budgetary constraints, with which state judges have a 
more natural familiarity. 
A. Federal Courts: The PLRA and Justiciability 
1. Standing and Ripeness: Limits on Entry 
In an Eighth Amendment suit to enjoin the construction of a prison, there 
will be not be current inmates to bring the claim.199 This circumstance raises 
questions under Article III, which limits its grant of judicial power to 
“[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies.”200 The most likely plaintiffs in a suit to stop 
construction of USP Letcher would include the first individuals anticipated 
to serve time there, perhaps partnered with and represented by organizations 
 
198 See GLAZE & PARKS, supra note 3, at 8 (reporting that the total number of federal prisoners 
in 2011 was 214,774 while the total number of those in state prisons and local jails was 2,038,104). 
199 Indeed, a primary objective of the proposed litigation posture is to avoid inmates ever being 
placed in a facility that would expose them to toxic conditions. 
200 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting the judicial power of the United States to 
“[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies”). 
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such as the ALC or the HRDC.201 To reach the merits of the case, however, 
these parties would need to establish that they have standing to bring the 
case—a doctrine “that developed out of ‘some basic sense that not everyone who 
wanted to go to court could do so.’”202 This Comment does not comprehensively 
review the nuances of the Court’s standing requirements,203 focusing instead on 
the features that could pose challenges here. 
Generally, plaintiffs have the burden of establishing standing.204 Standing 
incorporates three constitutionally mandated requirements—injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability205—and a set of “prudential” requirements—those 
derived from separation-of-powers concerns.206 While the envisioned class of 
litigants might readily meet each constitutional component, principles of 
prudential standing could possibly preclude the claim. 
Particularly inhibiting, prudential considerations would likely foreclose 
third-party standing in this context such that an interested organization could 
 
201 This might include the recently convicted or inmates scheduled to be transferred from other 
facilities. Inmates from other facilities may, for example, be scheduled for transfer to USP Letcher 
as a function of “[p]opulation [m]anagement” if “it is necessary to impose a moratorium or 
population cap on [their current] institution to avoid or reduce overcrowding.” Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Inmate Security Designation and Classification Classification ch. 7, 
at 15 (2006), https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_008.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJY5-7SMX] 
[hereinafter Inmate Security Designation].  For more information about BOP’s designation process, 
including initial designation decisions and inmate transfer decisions, see generally Inmate Security 
Designation, supra. 
202 William I. Stewart, Comment, How to Avoid the Standing Problem in Floyd: A Relaxed 
Approach to Standing in Class Actions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1509, 1511 (2016) (quoting LARRY W. 
YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 322 (3d ed. 2009)). 
203 For a detailed discussion of the Court’s standing requirements, see 13B CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.10–.16 (3d ed. 2008); Leading 
Cases, Standing—Civil Procedure—Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 
128 HARV. L. REV. 321 (2014). 
204 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006). 
205 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
206 JEFFREY S. GUTMAN, SARGEANT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS § 3.1.B.4, http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/19#4 
[https://perma.cc/7DML-RTSG] (last updated 2016). The fault lines between constitutionally mandated 
and prudential standing requirements are debated. See Ernest A. Young, Prudential Standing After 
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 10 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 
149, 154 (2014) (noting that after the Court’s decision in Lexmark, “there may simply be no more 
‘generalized grievance’ rule distinct from the constitutional minimum of a ‘concrete injury’”); see 
also Craig R. Gottlieb, Comment, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate Constitutional and 
Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1126 (1994) (emphasizing the need for clarification 
from the Court with respect to constitutional and prudential limitations on standing and arguing 
that the “Court’s overreaching constitutional analysis prevents the lower courts from examining 
countervailing issues, thereby harming the courts when . . . issues militate in favor of granting 
standing”). Courts, too, have long intimated confusion with respect to demarcating constitutional 
from non-constitutional standing limitations. See, e.g., City of S. Lake Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 625 F.2d 231, 235 (9th Cir. 1980) (expressing “some confusion as to whether the ‘abstract injury’ 
standing bar is constitutional, or instead prudential”). 
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not “raise [future inmates’] legal rights.”207 This would prohibit, for example, 
the ALC or the HRDC from seeking an injunction on behalf of future USP 
Letcher inmates,208 save for the limited potential of associational standing, 
which allows a group to sue on behalf of its members.209 Associational 
standing would likely prove unsuccessful in light of Kowalski v. Tesmer, where 
the Court found that two criminal defense attorneys lacked standing to 
challenge a state’s process for appointing appellate counsel on behalf of 
Michigan’s indigent defendants.210 The reasoning in Kowalski casts doubt on 
the possibility that organizations like the ALC or the HRDC would meet 
associational standing requirements. In declining to reach the merits of the 
procedural requirement at issue, the Court emphasized that “[t]he only 
challengers before [it] [we]re two attorneys who s[ought] to invoke the rights 
of hypothetical indigents to challenge the procedure.”211 This language does 
not bode well for organizations seeking to invoke the rights of hypothetical 
prisoners to challenge the toxic conditions of confinement.212  
 
207 GUTMAN, supra note 206, § 3.1.A. Third-party standing generally requires a showing that 
(1) “the party asserting the right ha[ve] a ‘close’ relationship with the person who possess the right” 
and (2) that “there is a ‘hindrance’ to the possessor’s ability to protect his own interests.” Kowalski 
v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)). While the 
prohibition against third-party standing is not absolute, the Court does “not look[] favorably upon 
third-party standing” in most circumstances. See id. (describing the few categories of cases in which 
the Court “ha[s] been quite forgiving,” including the First Amendment and circumstances in which 
“enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in the violation 
of the third parties’ rights” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 510 (1975))).       
208 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (noting that “restrictions on third-party 
standing” are “designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into controversies”). 
209 See GUTMAN, supra note 206, § 3.1.C (defining associational standing as “an exception to 
the general prohibition on third-party standing”). 
210 543 U.S. at 134. 
211 Id. at 127. 
212 The parallels between the relationship the ALC or HRDC would have to future USP 
Letcher County inmates—and the relationship the attorneys in Kowalski had to “yet unascertained 
Michigan criminal defendants,” are telling. Id. at 130. For example, to demonstrate a sufficiently “close” 
relationship, the attorneys in Kowalski invoked the attorney–client relationship, which the Court had found 
to be adequate in other cases. See id. at 130-31 (citing cases in which the attorney–client relationship sufficed 
to confer third-party standing, including Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990) and 
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989)). The hindrance analysis 
presents more complicated questions, as the ability of the future inmates to assert their own 
constitutional rights is bound up with the ultimate question; if the Court recognized future inmates’ 
constitutional right to be free from potential incarceration in a toxic facility, future inmates may be 
hindered from advancing that interest because they will not have occasion to challenge the location 
until they are sentenced to serve time there (or learn that they are to be transferred there). 
Considering the federal designation process “is normally completed within seven working days from 
the date the [BOP’s Designation and Sentence Computation Center] receives all case documents,” 
convicted defendants would have an impracticably small window of time to contact and retain 
counsel and prepare filings. Alicia Vasquez & Todd Bussert, How Federal Prisoners Are Placed: 
Shedding Light on BOP’s Inmate Classification and Designation Process, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2016, at 19, 
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As an organizational challenge to the construction of USP Letcher would 
closely resemble the claims asserted in Kowalski and would thus have little 
chance of success, the most likely plaintiffs with standing to sue to enjoin 
construction would be future inmates. The practical implications of this 
conclusion present a problem: by the time inmates are booked at USP 
Letcher, construction will likely be rather far along or complete.213 At this 
point, the parties would likely be seeking cessation of operations, as opposed 
to enjoining construction. However, as discussed more fully below,214 the 
practical timing limitations does not mean the endeavor would be in vain. 
Were the prospect of an injunction looming over the officials and 
administrators responsible for the prison construction, the potential for sunk 
costs may bring construction to a halt far in advance of litigation.215   
While standing doctrine governs who may bring a particular suit, the related 
doctrine of ripeness governs when it is appropriate to bring such a suit.216 
Ripeness limitations seek to prevent adjudication over “contingent future events 
that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”217 Ripeness 
overlaps with the standing doctrine’s injury-in-fact analysis in that both aim to 
prevent litigation regarding overly speculative injury.218 Notably, “when a court 
declares that a case is not prudentially ripe, it means that the case will be better 
decided later and that the parties will not have constitutional rights undermined 
by the delay.”219 
The intersection of ripeness and the Eighth Amendment future harm 
analysis raises interesting and difficult questions. Insofar as the scope of the right 
at issue defines the universe of ripe claims, the Court’s recognition of exposure 
as a cognizable harm in the prison conditions context informs the ripeness 
analysis. When exposure is the injury, ferreting out cases because they rely on 
“contingent future events” becomes tricky business, as the concept of exposure-
as-injury necessarily entails the idea of a future contingent event (i.e., future 
illness as a result of toxic exposure). In any event, it is clear that the ripeness 
 
20. This (1) assumes a level of legal sophistication that is unrealistic among the potential litigants, 
see, e.g., John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67 BROOK. L. 
REV. 429, 431 (2001) (referring to “the mostly uneducated, unsophisticated, and legally uncounseled 
population of the prisons”); and (2) risks violation of the asserted right in the meantime (by placement 
or transfer). 
213 This issue might play a role in the third-party standing analysis. See supra note 207. 
214 See infra note 258 and accompanying text.  
215 This is especially likely considering the generally poor economies of towns in the business 
of recruiting federal prison construction, including Letcher County.  
216 GUTMAN, supra note 206, § 3.2. 
217 Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985)). 
218 GUTMAN, supra note 206, § 3.2. 
219 Simmonds v. INS, 326 F.3d 351, 357 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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requirement does not nullify the Court’s substantive holding that inmates need 
not await a tragic event in order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 
The crucial question here is how far that exposure extends, and whether 
courts would be amenable to the argument that being sentenced to serve time at 
USP Letcher (or being schedule for transfer there) constitutes sufficient exposure 
to toxic conditions, and thus a cognizable injury under the Eighth Amendment. 
The reasoning essentially boils down to an inevitable-exposure-to-exposure 
argument—that designation at USP Letcher will inevitably expose inmates to 
toxic exposure. The evidence relevant to the objective analysis of the prison 
conditions analysis would thus militate in favor of finding the Letcher County 
claim to be ripe, assuming sufficient evidence was presented to firmly 
establish causation.220  
2. The PLRA: Limits on Remedies 
In 1996, Congress, through the PLRA, limited federal courts’ ability to 
intervene in prison administration.221 Passed as a response to the judiciary’s 
expanded role in addressing prison conditions,222 as recounted in Part II, the 
PLRA established criteria that an inmate must meet before a court can even hear 
the claim. Some of the more important criteria include an exhaustion requirement, 
filing fees, a three-strikes provision, and a physical injury requirement. Specifically, 
• a prisoner must first exhaust all available internal prison 
grievance processes;223 
• an inmate who qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis must 
nevertheless pay a filing fee, including an initial partial fee and, if 
necessary, subsequent monthly payments for the remainder;224 
• an inmate may not bring a claim if he or she has, on three prior      
 
220 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
221 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) 
222 See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (“Beyond doubt, Congress enacted [PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement] to reduce the quantity and improve the quality if prisoner suits . . . .”). 
223 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). 
224 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2) (2012). Still, the initial fee will not be exacted if the prisoner has 
no means to pay it, id. § 1915(b)(4), and no monthly installments are required unless the prisoner 
will have more than $10 in his account after paying the fee. Id. § 1915(b)(2). Otherwise, however, the 
initial filing fee cannot be waived. See Amy Howe, Argument Preview: Filing Fees and Payments Under 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 3, 2015, 7:58 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2015/11/argument-preview-filing-fees-and-payments-under-the-prison-litigation-reform-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/3Q24-BJ4G] (“Instead of waiving the fees for prisoners, the [PLRA] does the 
opposite. It requires indigent prisoners to pay the filing fees for their lawsuits by paying part up 
front and then making monthly installment payments of twenty percent of their previous month’s 
income until the fees are paid in full.”). 
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• occasions, brought a claim that was ultimately dismissed on 
the grounds of being frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a 
proper claim;225 and 
• an inmate must prove physical injury in addition to mental or 
emotional harm.226 
Most importantly for this Comment, the PLRA also circumscribes federal 
courts’ ability to grant prospective injunctive relief such as prison population 
reduction orders. Specifically, the PLRA requires that prospective remedies 
be as narrowly tailored as possible: “The court shall not grant or approve any 
prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, 
extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, 
and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the 
Federal right.”227 In addition, before a court issues a prisoner release order, a 
court must have first “entered an order for less intrusive relief that has failed to 
remedy the deprivation of the Federal right [at issue]”228 and must determine 
that “crowding is the primary cause of the violation of [that] right.”229 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Court in Plata approved a prison 
population reduction order, demonstrating that the PLRA does not 
completely handcuff federal courts with respect to prospective injunctive 
relief.230 The Court reasoned that the constitutional violations at issue could 
not be remedied without a reduction because overcrowding was their primary 
cause.231 The order could not be more narrowly tailored because the violation 
 
225 Id. § 1915(g). Notably, some courts have held that claims dismissed prior to PLRA’s 
enactment are counted against the three-strike limit. See, e.g., In re Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 
208 F.3d 1032, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Welch v. Galie, 207 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2000). 
226 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Courts faced with the question have held that the physical injury 
requirement only applies to money damages, not to injunctive or declaratory relief. See, e.g., Harper 
v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[The PLRA] prohibits only recovery of . . . 
[psychological] damages . . . absent a physical injury.”); Perkins v. Kan. Dept. of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 
808 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Our research reveals that only two circuits have considered whether [the 
PLRA’s physical injury requirement] limits claims for injunctive or declaratory relief, and both have 
concluded that it does not” (citing Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 
1998); Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 462-63 (7th Cir. 1997))). 
227 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2012). For a brief discussion of the relationship between the 
PLRA’s limits on ongoing injunctive relief and justiciability, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., 
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 92 (7th ed. 2015) 
(describing Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000), which held that Congress had the “authority ‘to 
alter the prospective effect of previously entered injunctions’ . . . where Congress validly alters the 
substantive law on which an injunction was predicated . . . without Congress’ having impermissibly 
revised a ‘final’ judgment”).  
228 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i). 
229 Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i). 
230 See supra Section II.C. 
231 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011). 
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had only one possible remedy. In this way, Plata leaves the door open for 
enjoining prison construction on a toxic waste site. There is only one way to 
remedy the violation of the federal right at issue—halting construction and 
ceasing operations. While extreme, the remedy cannot be any more narrowly 
tailored because the unconstitutional prison condition inheres in the location 
itself. Nor do the expansive effects of this injunction preclude it from being 
narrowly tailored. As the Court noted in Plata, a remedy “does not fail narrow 
tailoring simply because it will have positive effects beyond the plaintiff 
class.”232 The Court’s rationale with respect to the systemwide violations in 
medical care in California’s prisons applies to future USP Letcher inmates with 
equal force: “On any given day, prisoners . . . may become ill, thus entering the 
plaintiff class.”233 
B. State Courts: A Solution Through Subsidiarity 
In light of the limitations on federal courts’ ability to hear and provide 
remedies in suits to enjoin the construction of a prison on a toxic site, the 
state forum likely proves a more attractive option for potential plaintiffs. Claims 
are still cognizable in state court because the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.234 Yet, state courts are bound neither by the stringent 
justiciability doctrines of the federal courts nor the strictures of the PLRA.235 
Moreover, since the majority of American prisoners are housed in state 
prisons and local jails,236 state courts have authority over more potentially at-
risk inmates. 
First, state justiciability doctrines are more generous because they are not tied 
to Article III separation-of-powers concerns.237 For example, though federal 
justiciability doctrines prohibit advisory opinions, “some state courts play an 
 
232 Id. at 531. 
233 Id. at 520. 
234 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (“[A] state law which . . . inflicts 
a cruel and unusual punishment . . . violat[es] . . . the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also id. at 675 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment applies to the states “by reason 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (citing Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 
459, 463 (1947))). 
235 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(d) (2012) (explaining that the PLRA does “not apply to relief entered 
by a State court based solely upon claims arising under State law”). 
236 See supra text accompanying note 198. 
237 For a detailed comparison of justiciability in the state and federal systems, see generally 
Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1833 (2001). 
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explicit and accepted advisory role in their relations with the other branches.”238 
Unlike the federal system, states that permit advisory opinions allow greater 
interaction among the branches, “allow[ing] the branches to signal to each other 
that problems require special attention.”239 This structure promotes interbranch 
communication, fostering a better environment for a court to enjoin prison 
construction as a “signal” to the legislature that this problem requires special 
attention.240 As opposed to the federal restriction on “widely shared grievances,”241 
state courts have broader ability and authority to address different environmental 
problems, including planned prison construction. Specifically, “some states have 
standing rules that afford citizens, taxpayers, and legislators roles in vindicating 
shared state constitutional interests.”242 
Second, as a federal statute, the PLRA does not bind state courts; state courts, 
therefore, might have greater latitude in fashioning a remedy, including enjoining 
construction.243 This solution is complicated by the fact that many states have 
parallel PLRA statutes. Anticipating a shift in prison litigation from federal court 
to state court following the enactment of the PLRA, “the National Association of 
Attorneys General pushed hard for state PLRAs” such that “all but a few states now 
have some kind of system that specially regulates inmate access to state court.”244 
 
238 Id. at 1845; see also id. at 1845-46 (noting that eight state constitutions “authorize the 
judiciary to give advice when the legislature or governor so requests” and that three states assign 
this power statutorily). 
239 Id. at 1847. 
240 Hershkoff describes the following Kentucky Supreme Court decision that highlights the 
ways in which broader standing rules can facilitate advantageous intrastate interaction. In the 1980s, 
Kentucky was one of several states pursuing investment by Toyota through “incentives and subsidies 
such as infrastructure improvements, labor assistance, and tax breaks.” Id. at 1858. Kentucky won the 
bidding contest through “a mix of financing with public and private ownership [that required] special 
legislation.” Id. In anticipation of criticism regarding the winning program’s constitutionality, the 
agreement included a mandate that the state “take such actions as may be required for the validation 
through judicial proceedings of any legislation which may be enacted by the General Assembly.” Id. 
at 1859 (internal quotation marks omitted). In response, the Governor filed a declaratory judgment 
action. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court, in a 4–3 decision, upheld the Kentucky–Toyota agreement 
as constitutional, thereby facilitating the transaction. Id. (citing Hayes v. State Prop. & Bldgs. Comm’n, 
731 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Ky. 1987)). 
241 See id. at 1853 (noting that litigants “cannot use the federal court merely to air generalized 
complaints that others share”). 
242 Id. at 1854. 
243 At the outset of this brief discussion, it is important to note that “because prison reform 
cases have been concentrated in federal court, little scholarly attention has been paid to state laws 
that address or substantially affect prisoner litigation.” Alison Brill, Note, Rights Without Remedy:* 
The Myth of State Court Accessibility After The Prison Litigation Reform Act, CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 
662-63 (2008).  
244 Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1632 (2003). For a list of 
parallel state prison litigation reform laws as of 2003, see id. at 1635-36 n.272. 
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However, while “[s]tate PLRAs generally seem to apply very broadly,”245 
inmates still likely have a better chance at success in state court. States have 
greater latitude to construe their respective prison reform legislation more 
narrowly than their federal counterparts.246 And while relatively few, there 
are still some states that have not enacted prison litigation-limiting laws.247 
Most importantly for this Comment, state legislatures have been least 
active with respect to enacting parallel prospective relief provisions, leaving 
room for litigants to seek broad injunctive relief.248 Still, there is reason to 
doubt that this theoretical possibility has much practical significance for 
litigants on the ground, as “most state courts do not have a history of granting 
broad relief to inmates beyond relieving constitutional violations.”249 As one 
commentator has speculated, this difference is more likely a reflection of the 
fact that state legislatures do not need explicit prospective relief-limiting 
legislation because state judges are already unlikely to “engag[e] in lengthy 
supervision of prison conditions litigation.”250 
Another role that state courts might play in post-PLRA prison litigation 
involves the enforcement of private settlement agreements made during federal 
proceedings.251 A private settlement agreement, unlike consent decrees,252 need 
“not comply with the limitations on relief set forth in [the PLRA].”253 Crucially, 
however, such agreements are only permissible “if [its] terms . . . are not 
 
245 Sasha Volokh, Suing Public and Private Prisons: The Role of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/vo
lokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/20/suing-public-and-private-prisons-the-role-of-the-prison-litigation-
reform-act/?utm_term=.8275c8ea9874 [https://perma.cc/QD5B-YWCJ]. 
246 See, e.g., Adamson v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 753 A.2d 501, 516 (Md. 2000) (holding that 
Maryland’s Prison Litigation Act did not mandate exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to 
filing suit in state court against a private corporation contracted to provide medical care to inmates); 
State ex rel. Henderson v. Raemisch, 790 N.W. 2d 242, 248 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (allowing a prisoner 
to bring a claim despite four previous partial dismissals because there is “no clear agreement among 
the federal circuits on the answer to the question of whether a partial dismissal counts as a strike” 
under the federal PLRA). 
247 See Volohk, supra note 245 (noting that “an inmate may find himself in some PLRA gap . . . 
because his state has no PLRA”). 
248 See Brill, supra note 243, at 678 & n.175 (noting that by 2008, “limitations on prospective 
relief ha[d] only been adopted in [a] few states,” including Alaska and Michigan). 
249 Id. at 678. 
250 Id. 
251 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2) (2012) (allowing parties to enter into private settlement agreements).  
252 Before the PLRA, consent decrees were the primary mode through which parties to federal 
prison litigation settled. See Brill, supra note 243, at 660-61 (“[C]onsent decrees to remedy 
constitutional violations and inhumane conditions had dominated the prison landscape since the 
1970’s.”). However, consent decrees are subject to the PLRA’s limitations on remedy-fashioning such 
as narrow tailoring. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(1) (“In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, 
the court shall not enter or approve a consent decree unless it complies with the limitations on relief 
set forth [by the PLRA].”). 
253 Id. § 3626(c)(2)(A). 
782 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 741 
subject to court enforcement other than the reinstatement of the civil 
proceeding that the agreement settled.”254 In other words, agreements are not 
enforceable in federal court. Instead, the drafters made clear that state courts 
would handle claims related to breach of contract: “Nothing in this section 
shall preclude any party claiming that a private settlement agreement has been 
breached from seeking in State court any remedy available under State law.”255  
Policy reasons might also favor raising these claims in state courts. State 
courts are better positioned than their federal counterparts to address prison 
conditions claims because of prisons’ central role in local economies, and even 
state and local elections.256 State courts are also naturally better acquainted 
with the economic concerns that often drive prison construction in areas like 
Letcher County in the first place. Of course, this proximity to local fiscal and 
political concerns also introduces the possibility that state judges are ill-suited 
to render judgments related to potentially economy-destabilizing injunctions.        
While I do not attempt to tackle the differences between federal and state 
justiciability doctrines or the justifications for distinguishing between them, this 
Section is meant to provide general context for the injunctive action I envision. 
In sum, the relationship between broad justiciability doctrines and interbranch 
communication, the remedy-shaping flexibility available to state courts in 
contrast to PLRA-bound federal courts, states’ superior knowledge of the 
complexities of the local economy, and the fact that the majority of the 
incarcerated population is housed in state prisons all weigh in favor of 
choosing a state court for a suit to enjoin the construction of a prison on a 
toxic waste site. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has advanced a constitutional approach to remedying the 
troubling trend of prison construction on toxic waste sites. Having posited 
the doctrinal promise of that approach, the analysis does not answer the 
 
254 Id. 
255 Id. § 3626(c)(2)(B). 
256 Some have argued that states are the appropriate venue for prison reform litigation. See, 
e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN 
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 18 (1998) (“Standard doctrine holds 
that states have the right to make their own decisions in a variety of fields, and corrections was 
widely recognized as one of the fields most unambiguously assigned to state authority. But in the 
prison reform cases, federal courts imposed nationally defined rules on state prisons.”). Others 
disagree. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY 7-8 (2008) (submitting that “federalism was used by the conservative Congress of 
the 1990s . . . [to] greatly restrict[] access by prisoners to federal courts in the [PLRA]” and that 
“[t]he values traditionally invoked to justify federalism—states are closer to the people, states serve 
as a barrier to tyranny by the federal government, states are laboratories for experimentation[,] . . . 
are of little use in constitutional decision making”). 
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equally—or perhaps more important—question of its comparative or strategic 
value. Addressing prison conditions may be best left to the democratic process. 
While this Comment has focused on a specific litigation strategy for 
securing an injunction, the actual value of this approach is ultimately measured 
by the prospect of victories on behalf of specific classes of inmates. The true 
value of such a claim is the potential role it could play in the broader political 
system. A constitutional claim based on cruel and unusual prison construction 
could compensate for the general lack of political will that might otherwise 
prompt reform in this area.257 Drawing on principles fundamental to tort law, 
this claim would operate as a deterrent to choosing risk-laden prison sites while 
incentivizing public officials to choose safer locations.258 With the specter of an 
adverse Eighth Amendment decision looming, officials may think more carefully 
about bidding for a prison that might subject municipalities to enormous liability 
and sunk costs. 
Nevertheless, while constitutional litigation is just one of many ways to effect 
prison reform, it is one worthy of consideration by advocates and officials alike, 
as it is incumbent upon the members of a free society to resist the temptation to 
let out of sight mean out of mind. For indeed, “the moral test of government is 
how that government treats those who . . . are in the shadows of life.”259 
 
257 Here I refer to “a mentality shared by many: Why care about the rights of those who didn’t 
care about the rights of their victims?” David L. Hudson Jr., Why I Care About Prisoner Rights, FIRST 
AMEND. CTR. (May 25, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/why-i-care-about-prisoner-
rights [https://perma.cc/D9W8-GNSX]; see also Mary Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and 
Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (1997) (“Criminals are not popular. No politician in recent memory 
has lost an election for being too tough on crime.”). 
258 See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of 
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 854 (2001) (arguing, in the context of qualified 
immunity for police officers, that constitutional tort remedies have a deterrent effect with respect 
to “the undesirability of dragging public officials through a difficult legal process” and related 
“political costs”). 
259 Linda Rosenberg, Plenary Address at the 41st National Council Mental Health and 
Addictions Conference (May 2, 2011), published in part in Be the Change, 38 J. BEHAV. HEALTH  
SERVS. & RES. 281, 281 (2011). 
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